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THE LIMITATIONS OF SUPPLY CHAIN 
DISCLOSURE REGIMES 
ADAM S. CHILTON* & GALIT A. SARFATY† 
Although the past few decades have seen numerous cases of human rights 
violations within corporate supply chains, companies are frequently not held 
accountable for the abuses because there is a significant governance gap in the 
regulation of corporate activity abroad.  In response, governments have begun 
to pass mandatory disclosure laws that require companies to release detailed 
information on their supply chains in the hopes that these laws will either 
provoke companies to reform their practices themselves or create pressure 
from stakeholders to improve corporate accountability.  
In this Article, we argue that supply chain disclosure regimes are unlikely 
to have a large effect on consumer behavior, and, as a result, their effectiveness 
at reducing human rights abuses will likely be limited.  This is not only because 
scholarship on mandatory disclosure regimes in other areas has suggested that 
these regimes are frequently unsuccessful, but also because these problems are 
likely to be exacerbated in the human rights context.  We argue that this is due 
to the fact that supply chain disclosures do not provide information on actual 
products, the information in the disclosures only provides weak proxies for 
human rights outcomes, and the risks associated with supply chains vary 
dramatically across industries.  
In order to test our argument, we field a series of experiments that were 
designed to test how well consumers understand supply chain disclosures.  In 
our experiments, the nationally representative sample of respondents 
consistently rated disclosures reporting low levels of due diligence almost as 
highly as disclosures that reported a high level of due diligence.  Based on these 
results, we argue that supply chain disclosure regimes designed to change 
consumer behavior in order to reduce corporate human rights abuses should 
be reconsidered.  
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INTRODUCTION 
With the globalization of business, firms are increasingly relying on third-
party suppliers in countries plagued by weak governance.  Although this trend has 
provided economic benefits to workers in developing countries, recent tragedies—
such as the collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory in Bangladesh—have 
highlighted the potential of human rights violations occurring when firms outsource.1  
These tragedies have occurred, in part, because there is a significant governance gap 
with respect to the regulation of corporate activity abroad.2 
In an attempt to fill this gap, international legal instruments have been 
created over the past several decades to address the human rights conduct of 
                                                          
 1  See Jim Yardley, Report on Deadly Factory Collapse in Bangladesh Finds Widespread Blame, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/world/asia/report-on-bangladesh-
building-collapse-finds-widespread-blame.html. 
 2  See, e.g., PENELOPE SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: EXTRACTIVE 
INDUSTRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE (2014) (arguing that there is a 
persistent governance gap in the regulation of the activities of transnational corporations acting in states 
with weak governments).  
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transnational corporations.3  Most recently, the U.N. Human Rights Council 
unanimously endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in 
2011.4  The Guiding Principles affirm the corporate responsibility to protect human 
rights and outline remedies for victims of human rights abuses. These principles, 
however, are voluntary and lack independent monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms.  As a result, despite being well intentioned, these principles and the 
other existing international standards have been ineffective in closing the governance 
gap. 
Given the shortcomings of international law, domestic legislation is 
emerging as an alternative method for regulating the extraterritorial human rights 
abuses of corporations.  Within this shift to domestic law, governments are 
specifically turning to mandated disclosure as a way of filling the governance gap.  
Mandated disclosure regimes have gained traction, in part, because they are an 
indirect method of regulation that faces less political resistance than other regulatory 
techniques.5  These regimes aim to shape corporate behavior by using transparency 
as a disinfectant.6  Recent disclosure regulations require companies to provide 
information on their global supply chains, including due diligence measures that they 
have undertaken to prevent human rights violations by third-party suppliers 
(particularly slavery and human trafficking). 
Although several laws that mandate supply chain disclosures regarding 
human rights have been passed around the world, the first, and perhaps most 
important, such law is the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (CTSCA).7  
The CTSCA requires companies to disclose their efforts to ensure that their supply 
                                                          
 3  Existing standards include the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ILO’s Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights, the U.N. Global Compact, and ISO 26000.  See infra note 24.  
 4  See The U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights, The UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: An Introduction, 2, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/Intro_Guiding_PrinciplesBusinessHR.pdf; see also 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Human Rights, Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 3 (Mar. 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter U.N. Guiding Principles].  
 5  Mandated disclosure is an example of a “new governance” regulatory mechanism that relies on 
specific, inflexible mandates to change behavior.  New governance mechanisms stand in contrast to 
traditional command and control methods that are state-focused.  The new governance model is 
considered to be more flexible, participatory, and cost-efficient, and may promote more innovation and 
tailoring to local circumstances.  See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and 
the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (arguing there 
has been a decline of the “regulation” and a rise of the “governance” model of government); Martha 
Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 
(2003) (discussing the impetus for the move from public to privatized institutions that provide social 
goods).  For an application of new governance theory to international regulation, see Kenneth W. Abbott 
& Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: 
Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 541 (2009). 
 6  See Amitai Etzioni, Is Transparency the Best Disinfectant?, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 389, 398 (2010). 
 7  See California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1) (West 
2012) [hereinafter CTSCA, S.B. 657].  Another prominent supply chain disclosure law currently in force 
is the Dodd-Frank Act’s section 1502, under which companies must report to the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission on their suppliers’ use of conflict minerals.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–18 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012)) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act § 1502]. 
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chains are free from slavery and human trafficking.  The law affects millions of 
consumers, given that California represents the world’s seventh largest economy and 
the country’s largest consumer base.8  It has also served as the model for recent U.K. 
legislation on supply chain transparency and proposals for a similar law on the federal 
level in the United States and Australia.9  
The hope of these laws is that stakeholders will be better able to pressure 
companies to change their behavior if they have access to disclosed information or 
that being forced to provide information will prompt companies to reexamine 
questionable practices.10  For example, customers may consider information on a 
company’s level of due diligence when making their purchasing decisions.  Activists 
and NGOs may use this information to exert reputational pressure as part of a 
campaign for better sourcing and human rights practices among companies.  
Investors may alter their investment choices on the basis of this information.  Finally, 
the requirement of disclosing information may lead companies to change their 
behavior even without pressure being exerted by consumers, NGOs, or investors.  
Although supply chain disclosure laws could theoretically influence 
companies through any of these mechanisms, the laws have (at least primarily) been 
crafted to compel companies to provide information targeted to consumers who are 
making purchasing decisions.  For example, the CTSCA was designed with the 
intention that the content and format of the disclosures would be useful for 
consumers.11  The guidance the state of California has released on the document 
specifically notes that “[t]he Act is expressly intended to ‘educate consumers on how 
to purchase goods produced by companies that responsibly manage their supply 
chains,’ and therefore disclosures should be made in a manner that best serves this 
                                                          
 8  See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS ACT: A 
RESOURCE GUIDE, i (2015), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/sb657/resource-guide.pdf 
[hereinafter CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE RESOURCE GUIDE]. 
 9  See U.K. Modern Slavery Act of 2015, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/30/contents/enacted; Business Supply Chain Transparency 
Act of 2015, H.R. 3226, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-
bill/3226/text/ih?overview=closed [hereinafter Business Supply Chain Transparency Act].  The 
Australian government has indicated a willingness to enact legislation similar to the CTSCA and 
convened a Supply Chains Working Group to assess regulatory options.  See Commonwealth of 
Australia, Australian Government Response to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade Committee report: Trading Lives: Modern Day Human Trafficking (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=
jfadt/slavery_people_trafficking/report.htm. 
 10  See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 695 (2003); David Hess, Social 
Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Corporate Accountability 
Through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453, 462 (2007); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as 
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 
GEO. L.J. 257, 262 (2001); Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Foreword: Making Sense of Information 
for Environmental Protection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1359 (2008); Lobel, supra note 5, at 454–55; 
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5, at 561. 
 11  See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at i (“A recent law in California is 
poised to help California consumers make better and more informed purchasing choices.  The California 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act (Steinberg, 2010) (the ‘Act’) provides consumers with critical 
information about the efforts that companies are undertaking to prevent and root out human trafficking 
and slavery in their product supply chains—whether here or overseas.”).  Id. at 1 (“The California 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act, which became effective on January 1, 2012, empowers California 
consumers to join the fight against human trafficking by giving them access to information about 
retailers’ and manufacturers’ efforts to eradicate such labor practices from their supply chains.”).   
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public policy.”12  As a result, companies are directed to design their disclosures to 
provide information in a concise, structured, and easy to read format.  In other words, 
instead of providing the kind of comprehensive information that would be useful to 
activists or investors, the law was designed to provide information that could change 
consumer behavior.  
In this Article, we argue that supply chain disclosure regimes are unlikely to 
have their intended effect of directly changing consumer behavior.  Although hardly 
any research directly on the effectiveness of supply chain disclosure regimes has been 
conducted to date, supply chain practices are not the only subject that governments 
are compelling companies to disclose information on.  Instead, supply chain laws are 
part of a growing body of disclosure regulations that have become ubiquitous in a 
variety of areas.13  But as this body of disclosure regulations has grown, so has an 
extensive literature empirically studying their effectiveness.  This literature has 
largely challenged the value of mandated disclosures and has particularly questioned 
whether consumers in fact read and understand them.14  
Moreover, the problems that have limited the effectiveness of disclosure 
regimes are likely to be exacerbated in the context of supply chain disclosures.  We 
argue that disclosures are not only unlikely to be read and understood generally, but 
there are also several specific features of human rights-related supply chain 
disclosure regimes that make them even less likely to be useful to consumers.  Most 
notably, while most disclosures concern the quality of a firm’s product or service, 
supply chain disclosures provide information on the process by which a product was 
manufactured (in the case of the CTSCA, whether human trafficking and slavery may 
have been used in the production process).  Moreover, human rights-related supply 
chain disclosures are likely to be uniquely difficult to interpret because they do not 
provide information on the actual number of human rights abuses a company has 
committed.  They instead only provide information on the level of due diligence 
companies conduct to minimize the risk of human rights violations in their supply 
chains.  Finally, it is difficult for consumers and experts alike to assess the probability 
of human rights abuse in a given company’s supply chain because the levels of risk 
vary considerably based on a company’s size, industry, the country in which it 
operates, the number of tiers of suppliers in its supply chain, and the total number of 
                                                          
 12  Id. at 5. 
 13  See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO 
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE, 1–13 (2014).  For specific examples, see, e.g., JAMES 
T. HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH REVELATION: THE ORIGIN, POLITICS, AND IMPACTS OF THE 
TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM (2005); William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: 
Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1707 (1999). 
 14  Some critics still see mandated disclosure as a promising tool if designed properly.  See ARCHON 
FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF 
TRANSPARENCY 1–15 (2007); Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About Themselves, 
3 ERASMUS L. REV. 93, 98 (2010); Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website 
Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 849–52 (2006); see also Daniel 
Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer 
Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394 (2014) (emphasizing that mandatory disclosures would promote 
market discipline or facilitate efforts of markets intermediaries).  Yet others are more skeptical that this 
regulatory technique can be fixed.  See Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and 
Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574 (2012) (empirically analyzing effect of restaurant sanitation 
grading disclosures); BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 34–35; Etzioni, supra note 6 
(analyzing effect of mandatory disclosure on corporations).  
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suppliers.  Taken together, these features of supply chain disclosures make them 
likely to be even less effective than disclosures in other contexts.  
In order to test our argument, we engaged a leading market research firm to 
recruit a nationally representative sample of respondents to complete a series of 
experimental tests designed to measure whether consumers are able to understand the 
contents of supply chain disclosures.  In the primary experiment, we asked 
respondents to read a company’s disclosure and then rate the company’s likely 
commitment to eradicating slavery and human trafficking from its supply chain.  For 
the experimental treatment, we also randomly varied whether the disclosure reported 
a high level of supply chain due diligence (indicating that the company is undertaking 
a comprehensive effort to eradicate human rights violations from its supply chain) 
versus a low level (indicating little effort by the company to manage human rights 
risks within its supply chain).  We further randomly varied whether the disclosure 
only provided the basic information that the law requires, or whether the disclosure 
went beyond compliance by conforming to the model disclosure guidelines that have 
been released by the state of California.  In both our primary experiment and our 
additional tests, the respondents consistently rated disclosures that either were 
completely non-compliant or reported low levels of due diligence almost as highly 
as disclosures that reported a high level of due diligence.  These results give credence 
to our theory that it is unlikely that consumers will be able to differentiate between 
these disclosures sufficiently to pressure companies to reduce the risk of human rights 
abuses in their supply chains.  
It is important to note that our argument and experimental results only 
suggest that supply chain disclosures are unlikely to be understood and used by 
consumers making purchasing decisions.  It is admittedly still possible that, even if 
the disclosures may not have the effect of changing consumers’ impressions of 
companies, being forced to produce disclosures will compel companies to reconsider 
their supply chain practices even without any external pressure.  Additionally, the 
disclosures may instead provide information that can be used by advocates in public 
relations campaigns, lawsuits, or other forms of advocacy.  In fact, consumer class 
action lawsuits have recently been filed against Nestlé and Costco based on claims 
of misleading and unfair business practices, which stem from the companies’ alleged 
failure to ensure that their CTSCA public disclosures accurately represent their 
human rights practices.15  Given the potential of leveraging information in CTSCA 
disclosures to facilitate litigation, disclosures may have an effect unrelated to the way 
that consumers respond to and comprehend them.  If these are the primary ways that 
supply chain disclosures are likely to have an effect, however, it would still call into 
question the existing regimes because they have focused on designing short 
disclosures directed at consumers and not the kind of comprehensive disclosures that 
would be most useful for developing a lawsuit.  
This Article proceeds as follows.  In Part I, we discuss the ineffectiveness of 
international law in regulating companies’ human rights practices as well as the rise 
                                                          
 15  The class action cases against Nestlé and Costco alleged forced labor in their supply chains and 
argued that the companies’ CTSCA statements on their websites were misleading as to their labor 
practices.  The Costco case was recently dismissed for lack of standing, while the Nestlé case was 
dismissed in accordance with California’s “safe harbor” doctrine, which limited Nestlé’s liability.  
However, the Nestlé case has been appealed to the 9th Circuit.  See Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 
15-3783, 2016 WL 192569 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016); Barber v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954 
(C.D. Cal. 2015).  
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of efforts to do so through mandated disclosure.  We then describe the CTSCA and 
our findings of corporate compliance with and consumer awareness of this law.  In 
Part II, we discuss the need to critically examine supply chain regulations in light of 
existing literature challenging the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure regimes in 
general.  We then highlight the unique characteristics of human rights-related supply 
chain disclosures that suggest that they are even less likely to be effective than 
disclosure regimes in other contexts.  In Part III, we present the results of our primary 
experiment designed to assess how supply chain disclosures influenced consumer 
confidence in corporate efforts to root out human trafficking and slavery.  We then 
present the results of three additional tests of how respondents reacted to supply chain 
disclosures.  These tests measured: (1) the influence of disclosures on consumer 
comprehension; (2) consumer views on actual disclosures; and (3) the reported 
influence of disclosures on potential purchasing decisions.  Finally, in Part IV, we 
discuss the implications of our results and argue that current supply chain disclosure 
laws should be reconsidered.  
I. TOWARDS SUPPLY CHAIN DISCLOSURE 
The tragic cases of corporate complicity in human rights violations abroad 
have given rise to calls for supply chain accountability.  Advocates have pursued 
international law as a mechanism to regulate multinational corporations, thus giving 
rise to a host of international standards culminating in the recently approved U.N. 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.16  Yet these voluntary standards 
have been ineffective in holding companies accountable for human rights abuses 
committed by their suppliers.  Therefore, some advocates are now turning to domestic 
law—specifically mandated disclosure—as an alternative to international legal 
mechanisms.  Recent legislation in the United States and United Kingdom requires 
companies to make disclosures on human rights due diligence conducted on their 
supply chains.17  The first and most prominent supply chain disclosure law aimed at 
consumers is the 2010 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (CTSCA), 
which is the subject of our study.  
A. The Ineffectiveness of International Law 
Scholars and policymakers have identified a governance gap with respect to 
the prevention of extraterritorial human rights abuses by multinational corporations.18  
In the words of John Ruggie, U.N. Special Representative for Business and Human 
Rights:  
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in 
the governance gaps created by globalization—between the scope and 
impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to 
                                                          
 16  See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 4. 
 17 See U.K. Modern Slavery Act; Business Supply Chain Transparency Act. 
 18  See, e.g., PENELOPE SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: EXTRACTIVE 
INDUSTRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE (2014); Kishanthi Parella, 
Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 749–50 (2014). 
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manage their adverse consequences.  These governance gaps provide the 
permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without 
adequate sanctioning or reparation.19 
There is a governance gap in the reach of both national and international law, 
thus leaving companies not legally accountable for potential human rights violations.  
Closing this gap is therefore a critical challenge.  
The governance gap is particularly pronounced in conflict-affected areas, 
where host states lack the political capacity, rule of law, and/or will to enforce human 
rights norms and provide redress to victims of human rights violations.20  Host states 
are primarily concerned with attracting foreign investment, which may mean turning 
a blind eye to domestic law violations or abstaining from passing human rights 
regulations that could lead companies to shift their business elsewhere (with fewer 
regulatory burdens).21  States in so-called “weak governance zones” are usually 
plagued by corruption and may be unable to prevent or stop human rights violations 
within their borders (and may sometimes be implicated in those violations 
themselves).22 
International law is a potential mechanism for closing the governance gap 
and regulating corporate human rights abuses abroad.  Scholars have argued that 
companies have legal obligations under international law, particularly for violations 
of human rights, labor rights, and environmental protection.23  A range of 
intergovernmental mechanisms have emerged over the past several decades to 
address the human rights conduct of transnational corporations.  Existing standards 
include the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ILO’s Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 
the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the U.N. Global Compact, 
and ISO 26000.24  These standards have been influential in developing new norms 
                                                          
 19  Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
 20  See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 4, at § I.B.7. 
 21  See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 
YALE L.J. 443, 460, 463 (2001). 
 22  See OECD, RISK AWARENESS TOOL FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN WEAK 
GOVERNANCE ZONES 9, 27 (2006). 
 23  See, e.g., ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 195–
270 (2006); José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT’L L. 1, 31 (2011); Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human 
Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 341 (2001); David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, 
From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International 
Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 933 (2004); Ratner, supra note 21, at 475–88. 
 24  See OECD, The OECD Guidelines For Multinational Enterprises: Text, Commentary and 
Clarifications, DAFFE/IME/WPG(2000)15/FINAL (Oct. 31, 2001), 
https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/? 
doclanguage=en&cote=daffe/ime/wpg(2000)15/final; International Labor Organization, Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (4th ed. 2006), 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_emp/—-emp_ent/—-
multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf; Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
(2000), http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-voluntary-principles/; United Nations, UN 
Global Compact (2000), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html; 
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and setting expectations for companies, many of which have responded by adopting 
internal codes of conduct and compliance systems on human rights.25 
The most recent and highly publicized international mechanism is the U.N. 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Guiding Principles), which were 
unanimously endorsed by the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2011.26  The Guiding 
Principles, which are the result of extensive, multi-year consultations, have become 
the dominant framework for articulating the international law landscape with respect 
to business and human rights.  The Guiding Principles rest on three pillars: (1) the 
state duty to protect human rights; (2) the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights; and (3) the need for access to remedies for victims of human rights abuses.27  
While the Guiding Principles assign states the primary duty to protect against 
corporate human rights abuses, they also urge companies to undertake a regular 
process of human rights due diligence whereby human rights abuses are treated as 
critical business risks. 
The Guiding Principles define the parameters of corporate due diligence, 
which is aimed at identifying, preventing, mitigating, and accounting for potential 
adverse human rights impacts.28  According to the Guiding Principles, the process of 
conducting due diligence should be ongoing throughout the life of an activity, include 
all internationally recognized human rights as a reference point, and extend to a 
company’s suppliers.29  Companies are expected to “seek to prevent or mitigate 
adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or 
services by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those 
impacts.”30  Business relationships are understood to include relationships with 
“entities in [a company’s] value chain.”31  The Guiding Principles further call on 
states to encourage, or where appropriate require, reporting by companies of their 
due diligence measures to prevent adverse human rights impacts.32 
Building on the recent approval of the Guiding Principles, the process is 
underway to develop a U.N. treaty on business and human rights.33  According to its 
proponents, a treaty could provide victims with access to justice remedies that are not 
                                                          
Int’l Org. for Standardization, ISO 26000: Guidance on Social Responsibility (2010), 
http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=42546.  For further discussion of these international 
legal mechanisms, see SIMONS & 
 MACKLIN, supra note 18, at 79–177. 
 25  See Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 400 (2004–2005); Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 23, at 949–60. 
 26  See The U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights, supra note 4; U.N. Guiding 
Principles, supra note 4, at 3.  
 27  See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 4.  
 28  Id. at Principles 17–21. 
 29  Id. at Principles 17, 18 cmt. 
 30  Id. at Principle 13(b). 
 31  Id. at Principle 13(b) cmt. 
 32  Id. at Principle 3 cmt.  The commentary states:  “A requirement to communicate can be 
particularly appropriate where the nature of business operations or operating contexts pose a significant 
risk to human rights.  Policies or laws in this area can usefully clarify what and how businesses should 
communicate, helping to ensure both the accessibility and accuracy of communications.”  Id. 
 33  For a discussion of options for a new international legal instrument on business and human 
rights, see Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Needs and Options for a New International Instrument in the Field 
of Business and Human Rights (June 2014), http://icj.wpengine.netdna-
cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/NeedsandOptionsinternationalinstICJReportFinalelecvers.compre
ssed.pdf. 
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outlined in the Guiding Principles and create binding obligations on corporations.34  
There has been broad support in the NGO community for such a treaty, with more 
than six hundred civil society organizations having signed a joint statement in 2013 
calling for a binding international legal framework to protect against corporate 
human rights abuses.35  In July 2014, the U.N. Human Rights Council passed a 
resolution to create an open-ended intergovernmental working group to propose an 
international treaty.36  A new expert legal group has been conducting consultations to 
inform the treaty process over a two-year period, beginning in July 2015.37  The next 
step will be to articulate options for the treaty, including whether it would only focus 
on gross human rights violations, and whether it would apply to only transnational 
corporations or also apply to state-owned firms, national companies, joint ventures, 
and subsidiaries.38 
Despite the development of multiple intergovernmental standards on 
business and human rights as well as the movement for a binding treaty, international 
law is currently an ineffective mechanism for regulating corporate human rights 
abuses abroad.  Existing standards have the status of voluntary soft law and lack 
independent monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.39  This includes the Guiding 
Principles, which have been criticized by many civil society organizations as 
deficient in many respects.40  For instance, the Guiding Principles do not call on home 
states to enact extraterritorial legislation.  The Commentary to the Guiding Principles 
states:  
                                                          
 34  See Surya Deva, Corporate Human Rights Abuses and International Law: Brief Comments, 
JAMESGSTEWART.COM: BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015), http://jamesgstewart.com/author/surya-deva/. 
 35  Treaty Alliance, Joint Statement: Call for an International Legally Binding Instrument on 
Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (2013), 
http://www.treatymovement.com/statement-2013. 
 36  See Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/26/9 (July 14, 2014).  
 37  The two-year treaty initiative is led by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) 
and The Corporate Accountability Working Group of the International Network for Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ESCR-Net).  See ESCR-Net, New Expert Legal Group to Consult Around the world, 
Then Develop Content Proposals for a Treaty on Human Rights and Corporate Activities: Project Launch 
2015–2016 (2015), https://www.escr-net.org/node/365893. 
 38  See John G. Ruggie, Life in the Global Public Domain: Response to Commentaries on the U.N. 
Guiding Principles and the Proposed Treaty on Business and Human Rights 4–6 (Jan. 23, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2554726. 
 39  See John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 
AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 834 (2007); SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 18, at 79–177; Kinley & Tadaki, supra 
note 23, at 958–60. 
 40  See Joint Civil Society, Statement on the Draft Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, (Jan. 2011), FIDH http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/Joint_CSO_Statement_on_GPs.pdf.  For further 
background and critiques of the Guiding Principles, see generally Larry Catá Backer, Moving Forward 
the U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights: Between Enterprise Social Norm, State 
Domestic Legal Orders, and the Treaty Law That Might Bind Them All, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 457 
(2015); Robert C. Blitt, Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Charting 
an Embracive Approach to Corporate Human Rights Compliance, 48 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 33 (2012); Anita 
Ramasastry, Corporate Social Responsibility Versus Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Gap 
Between Responsibility and Accountability, 14 J. HUMAN RIGHTS 237 (2015); Florian Wettstein, CSR 
and the Debate on Business and Human Rights, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 739 (2012); David Weissbrodt, 
Human Rights Standards Concerning Transnational Corporations and Other Business Entities, 23 MINN. 
J. INT’L L. 135 (2014); Cindy S. Woods, It Isn’t a State Problem: The Minas Conga Mine Controversy 
and the Need for Binding International Obligations on Corporate Actors, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 629 (2015). 
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At present States are not generally required under international human rights 
law to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their 
territory and/or jurisdiction.  Nor are they generally prohibited from doing 
so, provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis.41 
Even though the Guiding Principles recognize the “significant legal gap[s]” 
in home state practice with respect to regulating corporate human rights abuses, they 
only place a minimal burden on host states.  Moreover, despite calls to articulate legal 
duties for corporations under international law, the Guiding Principles stop short of 
taking this step.  As the introduction to the Guiding Principles affirms, “nothing in 
these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international law 
obligations.”42  
While the treaty process has gained momentum, it has also been subject to 
substantial criticism.43  The aforementioned 2014 U.N. resolution, sponsored by 
Ecuador and South Africa, only garnered a plurality, not a majority, of votes in the 
Council.  The opposing countries included the United States, all states in the 
European Union, Japan, and Korea; there were also 13 abstentions.  State opposition 
to the resolution reflects the lack of broad political support for this endeavor.44  It thus 
remains unclear whether the treaty process will result in an instrument that will garner 
approval by the U.N. Human Rights Council, and how long such a process may take.  
As a result, there is a risk that states will use this delay as an excuse for not 
implementing the Guiding Principles.45  In addition, negotiations to achieve 
consensus on a treaty may result in an instrument that is too vague to provide effective 
guidance.46  In the absence of a U.N. treaty, the international law landscape consists 
only of voluntary soft law standards, thus creating pressure for home states to address 
corporate human rights abuses abroad. 
B. The Rise of Domestic Disclosure Laws 
Given the limitations of existing international legal mechanisms, domestic 
law is emerging as a potential tool for regulating the extraterritorial human rights 
abuses of multinational corporations.  Home states are beginning to exert pressure on 
corporations to abide by international human rights norms abroad, particularly in 
light of the inability of host states to effectively govern companies that conduct 
business within their borders.  Since the U.S. Supreme Court recently limited the 
exterritorial application of the Alien Tort Claims Act,47 advocates are pursuing 
                                                          
 41  U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 4, at 3–4.  
 42  Id. at 1. 
 43  See Backer, supra note 40, at 530. 
 44  See Erika R. George, Incorporating Rights: Making the Most of the Meantime 2 (2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2560082. 
 45  See John Tasioulas, Human Rights, No Dogmas: The UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights 3 (Jan. 30, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2561420. 
 46  Id. 
 47  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) (finding that the Alien Tort 
Claims Act presumptively does not apply extraterritorially).  The Alien Tort Claims Act allows U.S. 
district courts to hear “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).  
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mandatory information disclosure laws as an alternative mechanism to promote 
corporate accountability.  
Supply chain disclosure laws require companies to report on their efforts to 
address human rights violations in their supply chains.  This “new governance” 
regulatory technique is less intrusive than one that imposes direct standards, and 
therefore faces less political resistance.48  For example, a supply chain disclosure law 
may require companies to provide information on whether they use third party 
auditors to verify the labor practices of their suppliers.  While failure to report under 
these regulations may carry penalties, information disclosure laws largely operate 
through non-coercive enforcement by facilitating pressure on companies by 
consumers, NGOs, and investors.49  
One example of an issue that supply chain disclosure laws have addressed is 
the use of conflict minerals.  The first legislation in this area was section 1502 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which imposes a new reporting requirement on publicly traded 
companies that manufacture or contract to manufacture products using certain 
conflict minerals.50  The stated rationale behind the law is that it will indirectly hinder 
financing of the ongoing conflicts in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) by curbing the state and non-state armed groups’ illegitimate exploitation of 
natural resources.  
Under section 1502, companies must disclose whether they source minerals 
originated in the DRC and bordering countries on a new form to be filed with the 
SEC (Form SD for specialized disclosures).51  If a company does source minerals 
from the DRC and bordering countries, it must also submit a Conflict Minerals 
Report on due diligence measures taken to determine whether those conflict minerals 
directly or indirectly financed or benefited armed groups in certain countries.52  The 
quality of the due diligence must meet nationally or internationally recognized 
standards, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from 
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.53 
One important feature of section 1502 is that because it requires an SEC 
filing, it imposes penalties on companies for not reporting or complying in good 
faith.54  Form SD is deemed filed under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
subject to section 18 of the Exchange Act, which attaches liability for any false or 
misleading statements.55  Section 1502 also has a public disclosure requirement on 
                                                          
 48  See supra text accompanying note 5. 
 49  Id. 
 50  See Dodd-Frank Act § 1502.  While section 1502 was passed in 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the SEC issued a final rule in 2012 following a long public comment period. 
 51  For an analysis of the first set of Conflict Minerals Reports filed with the SEC as well as further 
discussion of section 1502, see Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 419 (2015). 
 52  Id. 
 53  See OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-
Affected and High-Risk Areas (2d ed. 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264185050-en; see also 
Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274, 56281–82 (Sept. 12, 2012).  
 54  See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56280. 
 55  Id. 
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company websites, which facilitates third-party rankings and the leveraging of 
consumer, NGO, and investor pressure on companies to become conflict-free.56 
It is important to note that the United States is not the only country that has 
begun to use supply chain disclosure laws to limit the use of conflict minerals.  In 
February 2012, the DRC passed a law requiring all mining and mineral trading 
companies operating in the country to undertake due diligence on all levels of their 
supply chain according to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chains.57  Similarly in Canada, a conflict minerals act that would require 
Canadian companies to exercise due diligence in sourcing minerals from the Great 
Lakes Region of Africa in accordance with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance was 
introduced in the House of Commons in 2013.58  
Additionally, in late May 2015, the European Parliament endorsed a 
mandatory regulation on the responsible sourcing of minerals from conflict-affected 
and high-risk areas.59  The proposed law, which is estimated to affect over 800,000 
European companies, would require companies to disclose the steps they have taken 
to address risks in their supply chains for conflict minerals.  As compared to section 
1502, the European regulation would have a broader geographic scope, as it would 
apply to conflict minerals sourced in all conflict-affected or high-risk areas (not just 
in the DRC region).  In addition, the European law would apply not only to 
manufacturers but also to downstream companies (those that purchase from the 
smelter or refiner).  Finally, the regulation includes a mandatory certification 
program involving independent third-party audits for smelters and refiners and 
establishes a “European responsible importer” label for importers that comply with 
the regulation.60  The labeling component highlights the law’s focus on consumers: 
“[conflict] minerals, potentially present in consumer products, link consumers to 
conflicts outside the [European] Union.  As such, consumers are indirectly linked to 
                                                          
 56  There are already various consumer applications that track sustainability issues such as conflict 
minerals policies.  See, e.g., RANKABRAND, www.rankabrand.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2015); 
GOODGUIDE, www.goodguide.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).  In addition, the Enough Project has 
published a ranking of electronics companies in 2010 and 2012 based on a survey of their conflict 
minerals policies and performance.  See Enough Project, 2012 Conflict Minerals Company Rankings, 
RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO (2012), http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/conflict-minerals-company-
rankings. 
 57  See Arrêté ministériel N.0057.CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2012: Portant mise en œuvre du 
Mécanisme Régional de Certification de la Conférence Internationale sur la Région des Grands-Lacs « 
CIRGL » en République Démocratique du Congo, MINISTERE DES MINES DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO, Article 8, http://mines-rdc.cd/fr/documents/Arrete_0057_2012.pdf; see 
also Press Release, Glob. Witness, Congo Government Enforces Law to Curb Conflict Mineral Trade 
(May 21, 2012), 
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/Congo_government_enforces_law_to_curb_con
flict_minerals_trade.pdf. 
 58  Conflict Minerals Act, H.C. C-486, 41st Parl. (2013) (Can.), 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=6062040&File=4.  The Canadian 
Parliament ultimately voted down the bill.  
 59  The European Parliament had voted to reject the European Commission’s proposal for a 
voluntary system of self-certification and instead requested for mandatory certification.  See Press 
Release, European Parliament, Conflict Minerals: MEPs Ask for Mandatory Certification of EU 
Importers (May 20, 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20150513IPR55318/html/Conflict-minerals-MEPs-ask-for-mandatory-certification-of-
EU-importers.  
 60  See id.; see also European Parliament Votes for Tougher Measures on Conflict Minerals, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 21, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/may/21/european-
parliament-tougher-measures-conflict-minerals. 
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conflicts that have severe impacts on human rights.”61  The European Parliament will 
next engage in negotiations with European member states on the text of the proposed 
regulation, which will need final approval from the European Council to become law. 
C. California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 
Supply chain disclosure laws such as section 1502 of Dodd-Frank not only 
require companies to make disclosures to investors on conflict minerals, but also 
require companies to make disclosures directly to consumers on human rights more 
broadly.  The first, and most ambitious, of these laws is the 2010 California 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act (CTSCA).  
1. Requirements 
The CTSCA, which took effect January 1, 2012, is an anti-human trafficking 
law that targets the corporate supply chain and imposes disclosure requirements on 
multinational firms.  Under the CTSCA, companies are required to post disclosures 
if they meet three criteria.  The company must be a “[1] retail seller and manufacturer 
[2] doing business in this state [of California] and [3] having annual worldwide gross 
receipts that exceed one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000).”62 
The CTSCA requires companies that meet these three criteria to disclose 
their efforts to ensure that their supply chains are free from slavery and human 
trafficking.63  It outlines five topics that companies must report on their websites 
regarding their supply chain due diligence: verification,64 audits,65 certification,66 
internal accountability,67 and training.68 
                                                          
 61  See Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Setting up a Union System for Supply Chain Due Diligence 
Self-Certification of Responsible Importers of Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten, their Ores, and Gold 
Originating in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, Amendment 6, Proposal for a Regulation Recital 
8 (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-
2015-0141&language=EN#title2. 
 62  CTSCA, S.B. 657 § 3. 
 63  Id.  
 64  Id.; Verification:  “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that the retail seller or 
manufacturer . . . [e]ngages in verification of product supply chains to evaluate and address risks of 
human trafficking and slavery.  The disclosure shall specify if the verification was not conducted by a 
third party.”  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(1). 
 65  CTSCA, S.B. 657 § 3; Audits:  “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that the retail 
seller or manufacturer . . . [c]onducts audits of suppliers to evaluate supplier compliance with company 
standards for trafficking and slavery in supply chains.  The disclosure shall specify if the verification was 
not an independent, unannounced audit.”  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(2). 
 66  CTSCA, S.B. 657 § 3; Certification:  “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that the 
retail seller or manufacturer . . . [r]equires direct suppliers to certify that materials incorporated into the 
product comply with the laws regarding slavery and human trafficking of the country or countries in 
which they are doing business.”  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(3). 
 67  CTSCA, S.B. 657 § 3; Accountability:  “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that 
the retail seller or manufacturer . . . [m]aintains internal accountability standards and procedures for 
employees or contractors failing to meet company standards regarding slavery and trafficking.”  CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(4). 
 68  CTSCA, S.B. 657 § 3; Training:  “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that the retail 
seller or manufacturer . . . [p]rovides company employees and management, who have direct 
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As an information disclosure law, the CTSCA does not require companies 
to implement any new measures or ensure that their supply chains are free from 
human trafficking or slavery.  Rather, it simply requires disclosure on a company’s 
website of its efforts to eradicate human rights violations in its supply chain.  
Corporate statements must be accessible through a “conspicuous and easily 
understood link,” with the goal of helping consumers make informed purchasing 
decisions.69  Third parties are already beginning to compile this information in order 
to more effectively reach consumers.70  The only remedy for failure to comply with 
the law is an action brought by the Attorney General of California for injunctive 
relief. 
2. Compliance 
Since the Attorney General of California has not yet brought actions against 
companies for failing to comply with the CTSCA,71 it is an open question whether 
companies actually have compiled with the requirements of the law.  In order to 
analyze regulatory compliance with the CTSCA, we compiled a dataset of whether 
companies that met the law’s criteria had posted supply chain disclosures as of the 
summer of 2015.  
To identify companies that meet these criteria, we relied on a database 
compiled by KnowTheChain.  This non-profit organization “was initially created to 
encourage greater corporate understanding of the California Supply Chain 
Transparency Act” and continues to serve as “a resource for businesses and investors 
who need to understand and address forced labor abuses within their supply chains.”72  
As part of that mission, KnowTheChain has attempted to develop a list of companies 
that meet the criteria to make a disclosure under the CTSCA.73  
There are 501 companies on KnowTheChain’s list of companies that are 
required to make disclosures under the CTSCA.74  To build our dataset, we 
                                                          
responsibility for supply chain management, training on human trafficking and slavery, particularly with 
respect to mitigating risks within the supply chains of products.”  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(5). 
 69  CTSCA, S.B. 657 § 3; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(b). 
 70  For instance, KnowTheChain has compiled a dataset that checks whether applicable companies 
posted statements that addressed at least three of the five statutory requirements.  See Five Years of the 
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, KNOWTHECHAIN (Sep. 30, 2015), 
https://knowthechain.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/KnowTheChain_InsightsBrief_093015.pdf. 
 71  Although no actions have thus far been brought by the Attorney General of California, in April 
2015, the Office of the Attorney General sent informational letters to companies that are required to 
comply with the legislation but had not yet posted disclosure statements on their websites.  It also issued 
a consumer alert on the legislation and created an online form to report suspected violations.  See Press 
Release, Office of the Attorney General of California, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Issues 
Consumer Alert on California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (Apr. 13, 2015), 
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/sb657/consumer-alert.pdf?. 
 72  See About Us, KNOWTHECHAIN, https://knowthechain.org/about-us/. 
 73  To develop its list of companies that are required to make a disclosure under the CTSCA, 
KnowTheChain used a three-wave process.  First, a research team used criteria developed by an outside 
law firm to search the Hoovers D&B database for companies that met the CTSCA’s criteria.  Second, a 
different group of researchers used the Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database to identify additional 
companies that meet the CTSCA’s criteria.  Third, KnowTheChain also included a “small number of 
additional companies” that its research team discovered had already made disclosures in the list of 
companies required to do so.  See KNOWTHECHAIN, supra note 70, at 12–13. 
 74  KnowTheChain occasionally updates its database.  This number is based on the number of 
companies included on May 1, 2015.  This list, however, may be both under- and over-inclusive.  The 
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independently collected data on each of these 501 companies.  For each of these 
companies, we first attempted to determine whether they have posted a CTSCA 
disclosure.  For each company that had a statement available, we then coded 
information about the length, content, and visibility of its statement. 
Figure 1 displays the percentage of companies that have a statement on their 
website out of those identified by KnowTheChain as being required by the CTSCA 
to file a disclosure.  As Figure 1 shows, 79.2% (397 out of 501) have a CTSCA 
disclosure posted, and 20.8% (104 out of 501) do not.  

















Although roughly a fifth of companies have still not complied with the 
CTSCA, it does appear that compliance has increased over time.  KnowTheChain 
reports that when it launched in October 2013, 71% of required companies had posted 
a CTSCA disclosure.75  To increase compliance, in January 2014 KnowTheChain and 
the Business and Human Rights Resource Center began to contact companies that 
had not yet made disclosures.76  Of the 129 companies contacted, 44 companies 
responded to their communications (and 85 did not).77  Although this response rate is 
low, the targeted communication efforts may have contributed to the increase in 
compliance between when KnowTheChain began checking for disclosures in 2013 
and our efforts to check statements in the summer of 2015.  
                                                          
list is probably under-inclusive because many companies required to make disclosures are not easily 
identifiable using public databases.  Moreover, the list is possibly over-inclusive because there may be a 
few companies that voluntarily made disclosures even though they did not meet all three criteria (although 
we believe this to be a handful of companies at most). 
 75  See KnowTheChain: Mixed Corporate Response to California’s Transparency Law, HUMANITY 
UNITED (Feb. 12, 2014), https://humanityunited.org/knowthechain-mixed-corporate-response-to-
californias-transparency-law/; Announcing KnowTheChain.org (Oct. 21, 2013), HUMANITY UNITED, 
http://archive.humanityunited.org/blog/announcing-knowthechainorg#.Vd0JSZ1Viko.  
 76  See KnowTheChain: Mixed Corporate Response to California’s Transparency Law, HUMANITY 
UNITED, supra note 75. 
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For each of the 397 disclosures that we were able to locate, we coded their 
contents for compliance with the CTSCA.  We specifically coded whether each of 
the 397 disclosures reported on the five topics that companies are required to discuss 
according to the CTSCA.78  Figure 2 presents data on the number of topics that were 
covered in our dataset of disclosures.  

















As Figure 2 shows, there were ten companies that posted a CTSCA 
disclosure, but did not adequately discuss a single one of the topics the law requires 
for companies to disclose.  Instead, these companies posted more general statements 
on their efforts to avoid human trafficking and slavery.79  Additionally, there were a 
number of companies that posted disclosures, but did not address all of the required 
topics: ten companies addressed one topic; sixteen companies addressed two topics; 
thirty-four companies addressed three topics; and sixty-eight companies addressed 
four topics.  In total, 34.8% of the companies that filed disclosures did not discuss all 
five required topics.  
Roughly two-thirds of companies that filed disclosures, however, addressed 
all five of the required topics.  More specifically, 259 companies—65.2% of those 
that posted disclosures—addressed all five required topics.  However, since the law 
requires all five topics to be discussed, all companies that did not do so technically 
are not in compliance with the CTSCA.  This suggests that only a bare majority of 
                                                          
 78  For a general overview of the requirements of the CTSCA, see CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at 3–4. 
 79  For example, CarMax posted the following statement on its website:  “CarMax recognizes the 
serious nature of the crimes of human trafficking and slavery.  CarMax has taken and will take every 
reasonable effort to ensure that its supply chain is free of products that are tainted by human trafficking.  
Because all of the vehicles sold by CarMax in California are used vehicles, and all of the replacement 
parts CarMax uses in its reconditioning process are purchased from other retailers, CarMax believes that 
it has taken all necessary steps to audit and reasonably mitigate the risk that its products are tainted by 
the crimes of human trafficking and slavery.”  See CarMax Terms & Conditions, Required California 
Disclosure: CA Supply Chain Transparency, http://www.carmax.com/enus/legal-
notice/default.html#CA-supply-chain-transparency (last visited Jan. 2017).  
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companies that KnowTheChain identified as being required to file a disclosure in 
compliance with the CTSCA: just 52% of companies (259 out of 501) have posted a 
disclosure that discusses all five of the topics required by the CTSCA.80  
3. Awareness 
One notable feature of the CTSCA is that it is designed to present 
information directly to potential consumers.  As a result, it is worth evaluating 
potential consumer awareness and interest in CTSCA disclosures.  In an effort to do 
so, we administered a survey to a nationally representative sample of respondents in 
order to explore consumer awareness of the CTSCA.  In the survey, we asked 
respondents two questions designed to measure their familiarity with the CTSCA: (1) 
whether respondents were aware of the CTSCA81 and (2) whether they could 
correctly identify the purpose of the CTSCA.82  
Figure 3 reports the results of these questions.  As the left panel reveals, a 
reasonably large percentage of our respondents claimed to have heard of the CTSCA.  
More specifically, 25% of respondents reported that they had heard of the CTSCA.  
As the right panel reveals, however, only 10% of respondents correctly answered that 
the purpose of the CTSCA is to provide information on efforts to prevent and root 
out human trafficking and slavery.83  To put this in to perspective, if the respondents 
were guessing between the seven answer choices randomly, they should have guessed 
the correct answer 14% of the time.  
 
  
                                                          
 80  It is worth noting that instead of requiring all five topics to be discussed, KnowTheChain has 
elected to identify companies as compliant with the requirements of the CTSCA if they discuss 3 out of 
5 of the required topics.  
 81  We specifically asked:  “Have you heard of the ‘California Transparency in Supply Chains 
Act?’” 
 82  We specifically asked:  “Which of the following pieces of information do you think the 
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act requires companies to disclose?”  We then offered 
respondents seven answers to choose from:  (1) How the company is ensuring that all of its suppliers 
comply with safety standards; (2) efforts the company is undertaking to prevent human trafficking in its 
supply chain; (3) whether the company uses conflict minerals in its supply chain; (4) steps the company 
is taking to reduce its carbon emissions; (5) none of the above; (6) all of the above; and (7) not sure.  To 
reduce the influence of ordering effects, the order of the first four options was randomized.  
 83  These answers are comparable for respondents from California: 27% of respondents reported 
that they had heard of the CTSCA and 8% correctly identified its purpose.  
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Figure 3: Reported Awareness of the CTSCA 
 
That said, these results likely overstate levels of awareness of the CTSCA 
for three reasons.  First, our survey was administered online, and respondents could 
have taken the time to Google the CTSCA in another window.  Second, many of the 
respondents that correctly answered the question about the purpose of the CTSCA 
had also reported having previously not heard of the CTSCA.  In fact, only 6% of our 
respondents reported having heard of the CTSCA and could correctly identify its 
purpose (which is comparable to the 7% of respondents that would have been 
expected to have selected that combination of responses if randomly answering).84  
4. Other Examples 
The CTSCA has served as a model for the transparency in supply chains 
provision of the U.K.’s Modern Slavery Act (which was enacted in March 2015 and 
took effect in October 2015), as well as the proposed U.S. Business Supply Chain 
Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2015.85  The United Kingdom’s 
disclosure requirement is broadly applicable to all companies that supply goods or 
services to any part of the country and have turnover of at least £36 million.86  Thus, 
it is not limited to U.K. entities or entities with their primary place of business in the 
country.  Companies subject to the U.K. Modern Slavery Act have to prepare a 
slavery and human trafficking statement each financial year describing efforts they 
have taken to ensure that slavery and human trafficking are not taking place in their 
supply chains.  As in the CTSCA, the Act does not impose any affirmative obligation 
on companies to rid their supply chains of slavery and human trafficking; it only 
                                                          
 84  To be exact, 89 out of 1,421 respondents reported having heard of the CTSCA and could 
correctly identify its purpose.  For respondents in California, 9 of 169 (5%) respondents reported having 
heard of the CTSCA and could correctly identify its purpose.  
 85  See U.K. Modern Slavery Act; Business Supply Chain Transparency Act.  
 86  See U.K. Modern Slavery Act (Transparency in Supply Chains) Regulations 2015, SI 
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requires disclosure of any supply chain due diligence that were undertaken.87  
Companies must post their statements on a prominent place on their websites, thus 
highlighting the law’s intended goal of generating consumer pressure to motivate 
corporate performance.88 
While the United States has yet to pass a similar law, a proposed bill has 
been introduced several times in Congress: in 2011, 2014, and most recently in July 
2015.  If passed, this bill would apply to all publicly traded and private companies 
currently required to submit annual reports to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) (not just retailers and manufacturers doing business in 
California), as long as those companies have annual worldwide gross receipts 
exceeding $100 million.89  These companies would be required to disclose their 
efforts to identify and address specific human rights risks in their supply chains: 
forced labor, slavery, human trafficking, and the worst forms of child labor.90  
Companies would have to disclose the required information on their websites 
(“through a conspicuous and easily understandable link”).91  The proposed bill would 
also require companies to file annual reports with the SEC, as is currently required 
under the conflict minerals provision in the Dodd-Frank Act’s section 1502.92  
II. THE LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE REGIMES 
Disclosure laws operate under the assumption that transparency will lead to 
accountability.  In the case of supply chain disclosure regimes, the primary goal of 
these laws is to pressure companies to conduct a high level of due diligence on their 
suppliers, with the ultimate aim of preventing labor rights violations abroad.  In an 
ideal world, supply chain disclosures would lead to consumers making more 
informed decisions that would drive companies to change their behavior.93  Yet is that 
what happens in practice?  
                                                          
 87  Additionally, as in the CTSCA, the U.K. Modern Slavery Bill does not contain penalties but 
leaves open the possibility for the Secretary of State to bring civil proceedings in the High Court for an 
injunction or, in Scotland, for specific performance of a statutory duty to ensure compliance.  Id.  The 
U.K. government has released guidance on its transparency in supply chains provision in response to 
consultations with a wide range of stakeholders.  See U.K. HOME OFFICE, TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY 
CHAINS ETC.: A PRACTICE GUIDE (2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/471996/Transparency_in
_Supply_Chains_etc__A_practical_guide__final_.pdf; see also U.K. HOME OFFICE, MODERN SLAVERY 




 88  According to the act, “if the organization does not have a website, it must provide a copy of the 
slavery and human trafficking statement to anyone who makes a written request for one, and must do so 
before the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the day on which the request is received.”  U.K. 
Modern Slavery Act § 54(8).  
 89  Business Supply Chain Transparency Act § 3(3)(A). 
 90  Id. § 3(1). 
 91  Id. § 3(2)(A). 
 92  See id. § 3(1); Dodd-Frank Act § 1502. 
 93  Richard Craswell distinguishes between “static” and “dynamic” purposes of disclosures.  Static 
disclosures aim “to improve a consumer’s choice from among the existing choice set,” while dynamic 
disclosures “seek to improve the existing choice set by creating incentives for sellers to improve the 
quality of their offerings.”  See Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not To 
Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 334 (2013). 
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Although there is little research on supply chain disclosures directed at 
consumers,94 scholars have analyzed the value of mandated disclosure in a variety of 
other regulatory areas.  Existing literature has largely called into question the value 
of this regulatory tool and suggested a limited set of conditions under which more 
“targeted transparency” initiatives could work.95  Given the unique characteristics that 
distinguish human rights-related supply chain disclosures, we argue that they are 
even less likely to be effective than disclosure regimes in other contexts.  
A. Scholarship on the Effectiveness of Disclosures 
Mandated disclosure has become ubiquitous in a variety of regulatory areas, 
including privacy policies, informed consent in health care, and consumer protection 
in banking.96  Given the relative ease of enacting mandated disclosure as compared 
to more direct and intrusive techniques, this tool has become “the principal regulatory 
answer to some of the principal policy questions of recent decades.”97  Yet a growing 
academic literature has questioned the effectiveness of disclosure regimes given their 
reported failures to achieve their purported goals.98  The most acute criticisms are 
aimed at the perspective of consumers.99  A significant body of literature has focused 
on whether the public reads, understands, or trusts disclosures, and whether the public 
uses disclosures to enhance their decision-making. 
In fact, scholars have demonstrated that consumers frequently do not read 
disclosures, or at best only skim them.100  For instance, one study found that only one 
or two out of every thousand retail software shoppers actually read end user license 
agreements (“the fine print”) online.101  In other words, almost all online shoppers 
have not read the terms that they have agreed to.  Aside from issues of illiteracy, 
disclosures may be unreadable because of an “overload problem” from disclosures 
                                                          
 94  But see Sarfaty, supra note 51 (empirically studying compliance with section 1502 of the Dodd-
Frank Act).   
 95  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 14. 
 96  Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider discuss the reasons for the ubiquity of mandated 
disclosure—it appeals to lawmakers because it looks cheap, easy, and effective despite empirical 
evidence that may suggest otherwise.  See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 5–6. 
 97  BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 4. 
 98  Critics have also highlighted limitations of disclosure regimes from the perspective of the firms 
that disclose.  For instance, it is unclear whether disclosers can accurately ascertain what information 
they need to reveal under regulations, can locate and assemble the requisite data, and can effectively 
present that information to best reach consumers.  See id. at 3–13. 
 99  See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 647, 691–98 (2011). 
 100  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 545 (2014); Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity to Read” in Contract Law, 
5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1 (2009); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 94 (2012). 
 101  See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the 
Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014).  As a result 
of the low readership among buyers, there is a concern that sellers will impose unfair and one-sided terms 
in contracts.  See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 100; see also Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, 
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. 
PA. L. REV. 630 (1979) (discussing when imperfect information justifies intervention in consumer 
markets). 
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being too complex and copious for consumers to handle.102  Another reason that the 
public may not read disclosures is because of an “accumulation problem” from 
consumers being confronted with so much information from so many disclosures that 
it is difficult for them to remember, interpret, and apply that information.103  In other 
words, more information is not always better.  
Even if consumers do read disclosures, critics contend that the public 
frequently does not understand them and incorporates little (if any) of the information 
into decisions.  Disclosures are generally written at a college level and often fail to 
describe complex information in simple terms.104  Moreover, consumers’ 
psychological biases may shape how they perceive disclosures and ultimately how 
those disclosures shape their activity.105  For instance, a study of credit card 
disclosures revealed that consumers often have imperfect self-control and 
underestimate the likelihood of future adverse events, which makes them unable to 
factor in all of the relevant costs of credit card borrowing in disclosed terms.106  
Because people often misperceive, misinterpret, and misuse disclosures, it is difficult 
for policymakers to predict whether disclosures will be used appropriately.  Finally, 
the public may not trust the disclosers that release information.  There is a fear among 
some consumers that a company disclosing information “has managed to exploit 
imperfections in the measuring system, thus making its own brand look better than it 
really is.”107 
Yet these limitations do not necessarily mean that mandated disclosure is a 
completely ineffective regulatory technique or, worse, harmful given the costs it 
imposes on firms that disclose.  Scholars have emphasized that a key factor for 
determining success is how disclosures are designed and executed, keeping in mind 
the distinctive goals of each disclosure law.108  For the purpose of our study of the 
CTSCA, success is defined as changing firms’ behavior by impacting their decision-
                                                          
 102  See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 8–9. 
 103  See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY IN 
CONSUMER MARKETS 36-37 (2012); Eugene G. Chewning, Jr. & Adrian M. Harrell, The Effect of 
Information Load on Decision Makers’ Cue Utilization Levels and Decision Quality in a Financial 
Distress Decision Task, 15 ACCT. ORG. & SOC’Y 527, 539–40 (1990); Kevin Lane Keller & Richard 
Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information on Decision Effectiveness, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 
200, 211–12 (1987); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences 
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417 (2003); BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 
8–9. 
 104  See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 8.  
 105  See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY IN 
CONSUMER MARKETS (2012) (explaining how consumer contracts are a product of both market forces 
and consumer psychology); Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
33, 33–45 (2006); Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? 
An Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605 (2014) (finding that investors seek and 
assimilate information in decision-making); Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, 
Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505 (2006) 
(showing that information “shrouding” can be common in even highly competitive markets); Tess 
Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745 (2014) 
(exploring the psychological processes and biases that shape how consumers understand consent to fine 
print).  
 106  See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004).  
 107  Craswell, supra note 93, at 368. 
 108  See Bar-Gill & Oliver Board, Product-Use Information and the Limits of Voluntary Disclosure, 
14 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 235 (2012); Craswell, supra note 93; FUNG, GRAHAM, & WEL, supra note 14; 
Schwarcz, supra note 14. 
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making calculus through, for instance, consumer, investor, or NGO pressure.  The 
effectiveness of a disclosure in achieving this success thus may depend on “the 
length, format, and type of terms that are disclosed, as well as the setting in which it 
is presented.”109  
B. The Unique Difficulties of Human Rights Disclosures 
While there is an extensive literature on the effectiveness of mandated 
disclosure in other areas, little research has addressed the growing body of laws that 
require companies to disclose information about their supply chain in the hopes of 
improving human rights outcomes.  It is our argument that, even if companies 
complied with these regulations, there are at least three features of human rights-
related supply chain disclosures that suggest that they are less likely to be effective 
than disclosure regimes in other contexts: (1) the disclosures discuss production 
processes and not product characteristics; (2) the information they provide is difficult 
to interpret because they are only proxies for the probability of human rights abuses; 
and (3) the regimes ignore the considerable heterogeneity among companies with 
regard to the probability of risk, which complicates comparisons across disclosures. 
First, although mandatory disclosures typically require companies to provide 
information on features of their products or services, human rights-related disclosures 
are unique in that they require companies to provide information on the process by 
which a product was made.  For instance, a law may mandate credit card companies 
to disclose information about the quality of their products, such as the interest rates 
they charge.  In contrast, supply chain disclosure regimes do not require companies 
to provide information about their products’ characteristics; they instead require 
companies to disclose whether the processes used to manufacture their products are 
likely to allow for human rights abuses.  
In other words, if a consumer were deciding whether to buy a pair of jeans 
manufactured by Company A or Company B, a human rights-related supply chain 
disclosure would not tell the consumer anything about the durability of the fabric or 
the quality of the stitching.  Instead, the disclosure would inform the consumer, for 
instance, as to whether Company A or B hired third party auditors to assess potential 
human rights violations in the factory where the jeans had been sown.  Since the 
physical characteristics of the two pairs of jeans would remain the same even if one 
product were made without using child labor while another product was 
manufactured using child labor,110 the disclosure regime would only be effective if 
consumers were willing to change their purchasing decisions on the basis of an 
intangible benefit (e.g., supporting the human rights of employees who manufactured 
that product).  
Of course, supply chain disclosure regimes are not the only regulations that 
require companies to provide information on their production methods.  For example, 
other disclosure regulations that cover non-product characteristics include 
                                                          
 109  Joshua Mitts, How Much Mandatory Disclosure Is Effective? 9 (Oct. 4, 2014),  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2404526.  
 110  In international trade, this characteristic is referred to as a “non-product-related process and 
production method,” which does not render products as “unlike.”  In addition to the issue of human rights 
in a product’s supply chain, another characteristic that falls under this category is the environmental 
footprint of a product. 
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environmental disclosures relating to the sustainability of the production process (but 
that do not affect their safety) and those that describe animal well-being in the 
production process.  Since existing literature on the limits of mandated disclosure has 
largely focused on disclosures that do affect the quality of a firm’s product or service, 
human rights disclosures represent largely unchartered territory where we believe the 
effects are going to be even more attenuated.  
Second, human rights-related supply chain disclosures are likely to be less 
effective than other disclosures because they are uniquely difficult to interpret.  
Supply chain disclosures do not provide information on the actual number of human 
rights abuses a company has committed.  Instead, they provide information on the 
level of due diligence conducted by companies to minimize the risk of human rights 
violations in their supply chains.  These disclosure regimes thus operate under the 
assumption that due diligence efforts are reliable proxies for human rights outcomes. 
The disclosures are difficult for consumers to interpret, however, because it 
is unclear to what extent these proxies actually reveal the probability that a 
company’s suppliers will actually conduct human rights abuses.  In fact, it is unclear 
whether even experts can make reliable conclusions about the risk of human rights 
violations in corporate supply chains based on their disclosures.  In the case of 
disclosures under the CTSCA, do consumers have the expertise to extract an overall 
risk profile for a company based on information on verification, audits, certification, 
internal accountability, and training?  Is a company that uses third party auditors but 
does not have human rights training more or less likely to use suppliers that commit 
human rights abuses than a company that uses internal audits but does provide human 
rights training?  Therefore, even if companies post supply chain disclosures and 
consumers take the time to read them, it is not clear that consumers will know how 
to interpret the information.  
Third, when assessing the probability of human rights abuses in a given 
company’s supply chain, one must recognize that the levels of risk vary considerably 
based on a company’s size, industry, the country in which it operates, the number of 
tiers of suppliers in its supply chain, and the total number of suppliers.  Existing 
scholarship has empirically demonstrated that repeated audits are not the key 
predictor of workplace compliance with labor standards; rather, other factors such as 
the local institutional context (in particular, the strength of state regulatory 
institutions and the strength of local civil society) are more directly linked to effective 
compliance.111  Consumers are typically unaware of the multiple variables that impact 
a company’s risk profile, particularly given that supply chain laws such as the 
CTSCA impose the same requirements for companies that operate in different 
industries and geographic areas.  Therefore, it is difficult for consumers to rely solely 
                                                          
 111  See Greg Distelhorst et al., Production Goes Global, Compliance Stays Local: Private 
Regulation in the Global Electronics Industry, 9 REG. & GOV. 224 (2015); see also RICHARD M. LOCKE, 
THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER: PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY (2013); GAY W. SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE BOYCOTT: LABOR RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM (2007); Daniel Berliner et al., Governing Global Supply Chains: What We 
Know (and Don’t) About Improving Labor Rights and Working Conditions, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
193 (2015); Richard M. Locke & Monica Romis, The Promise and Perils of Private Voluntary 
Regulation: Labor Standards and Work Organization in Two Mexican Garment Factories, 17 REV. INT’L 
POL. ECON. 45 (2010); Richard M. Locke, Fei Qin & Alberto Brause, Does Monitoring Improve Labor 
Standards? Lessons from Nike, 61 INDUS. & LAB.  REL. REV. 3 (2007). 
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on these disclosures to draw conclusions about the underlying human rights risks 
within a company’s supply chain.  
C. Assessing the Effectiveness of Supply Chain Disclosures 
Taken together, we believe that the three issues raised in the last section are 
likely to limit the effectiveness of laws that seek to reduce human rights violations 
by requiring companies to post information about their supply chain due diligence 
efforts.  However, we are unaware of any efforts to date to empirically test the 
effectiveness of these regimes.  Although academics and NGOs have evaluated 
whether companies have complied with disclosure requirements, these studies have 
not tested the effect that these disclosures have on either consumer or corporate 
behavior.112  
Obviously, policy makers, scholars, and advocates are eager to know 
whether these laws will ultimately lead to fewer violations of human rights.  
Unfortunately, though, directly testing the effectiveness of these laws in producing 
positive human rights outcomes is complicated—if not impossible—for a number of 
reasons.  First, a great deal of the data that would be required for this analysis is not 
publicly available.  For example, data on the web traffic to companies’ disclosures 
are not publically available, and, most importantly, the kind of micro-level data of 
human rights abuses that would be required to conduct such a study is currently not 
available.  Second, since companies are not forced to post supply chain disclosures 
(even though they are legally required to do so), it is likely the case that the decision 
to post the disclosures is endogenous to human rights practices.  In other words, if 
only those companies that prioritize eradicating human rights abuses post disclosures, 
even research that found companies that post supply chain disclosures to be less likely 
to use suppliers that engage in human rights abuses would not demonstrate that it was 
due to the disclosure.  
Despite these obstacles, it is worth trying to find alternative ways to 
empirically assess the effectiveness of these regimes.  Given the difficulty of using 
observational research methods, one can use experimental methods to empirically 
assess whether the policy in question can lead to reductions in human rights abuses.113  
For corporate supply chain disclosures, the primary justification for requiring 
companies to post disclosures is to provide consumers with information that can 
shape their purchasing decisions, and in doing so, pressure companies to change their 
behavior.114  It is thus possible to gain some traction on the question of whether these 
laws are effective by studying whether consumers understand and change their 
opinions based on the information provided in supply chain disclosures. 
                                                          
 112  See, e.g., Chris N. Bayer, Corporate Compliance with the Transparency in Supply Chains Act 
of 2010 (Nov. 2, 2015), http://media.wix.com/ugd/f0f801_0276d7c94ebe453f8648b91dd35898ba.pdf; 
Five Years of the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, KNOWTHECHAIN (Sept. 30, 2015), 
https://www.knowthechain.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/KnowTheChain_InsightsBrief_093015.pdf. 
 113  For a defense of using experimental methods to test the effectiveness of laws aimed at improving 
human rights, see Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley, Why The Study of International Law Needs 
Experiments, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 172 (2013).  
 114  See supra note 11.  
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In an effort to assess the potential effectiveness of supply chain disclosure 
regimes, we designed a series of experimental tests to evaluate how consumers 
understand and interpret supply chain disclosures.  We designed our experiments to 
specifically test the effectiveness of the recently passed California Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act (CTSCA).  We chose to do so because it is the first supply chain 
disclosure law around human rights that was directed at consumers.  Given that 
California represents the world’s seventh largest economy and the country’s largest 
consumer base, this law has the potential to have a significant impact.115  Moreover, 
scholars have found a “California effect” whereby other state regulations and 
eventually federal law have ratcheted up standards to match stricter California laws.116  
Since disclosures are posted to company websites, consumers across the country (and 
the world) now have access to information on corporate human rights practices and 
can make purchasing decisions that do not “inadvertently promote the crime of 
trafficking.”117 
III. EXPERIMENTAL ASSESSMENTS 
To better understand how individuals process and understand supply chain 
disclosures, we embedded several experiments in a survey administered to a 
nationally representative sample of respondents.118  In this Part, we first discuss the 
motivation behind our experimental assessment of supply chain disclosure regimes.  
Second, we discuss the sample that we recruited for our study.  Third, we present the 
results of our primary experiment designed to assess how supply chain disclosures 
influenced consumer confidence in corporate efforts to root out human trafficking 
and slavery.  Finally, we present the results of three additional tests of how 
respondents reacted to supply chain disclosures: (1) the influence of disclosures on 
comprehension; (2) consumer views on actual disclosures; and (3) the reported 
influence of disclosures on potential purchasing decisions. 
A. Motivation 
We designed our experiments to test several aspects of how consumers 
understand and respond to the kind of supply chain disclosures that are required by 
the CTSCA.  First, we designed our experiments to test whether information on the 
topics required to be disclosed improves consumer confidence in corporate efforts to 
root out human trafficking and slavery.  As previously noted, the CTSCA requires 
companies to discuss five specific topics in their disclosures.119  It is not obvious, 
however, that consumers equipped with information on these five topics have greater 
                                                          
 115  See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at i.  California’s Franchise Tax 
Board estimates that approximately 1,700 companies are likely subject to the law.  Id. at 3. 
 116  For a discussion of the “California effect” as applied to the history of American automobile 
emission standards, see DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 248–70 (1995).  See also Brian Greenhill, Layna Mosley & Aseem Prakash, 
Trade-Based Diffusion of Labor Rights: A Panel Study, 1986–2002, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 669 (2009) 
(investigating the nature of the linkages between trade and labor rights in developing countries).  
 117  CAL. ATT’Y GEN., THE STATE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN CALIFORNIA: 2012 (2012), at 90. 
 118  Appendix A provides a figure illustrating the flow of our survey.   
 119  See supra text accompanying notes 64–68. 
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confidence in corporate efforts to root out human rights violations as compared to 
consumers that are provided general statements on a company’s commitment to 
human rights.  
Second, we designed our experiments to test whether consumers have 
greater confidence in disclosures that report a high level of due diligence among 
companies (indicating a comprehensive effort to eradicate human rights violations 
from its supply chain), as compared to disclosures that report a low level of supply 
chain due diligence.  Although the CTSCA requires companies to reveal their 
practices on five specific topics, it does not require companies to actually adopt 
specific policies on those topics.  For example, the CTSCA requires companies to 
discuss whether a third party verifies their supply chains, but it does not require 
companies to have a third party verify their supply chains.  Thus, the CTSCA aims 
to shape corporate behavior by providing information to consumers so that they can 
reward companies that take efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from 
their supply chain and punish companies that fail to do so.  In light of this goal, it is 
important to test whether consumers can in fact tell the difference between 
disclosures that make optimal versus minimal efforts to mitigate human rights risks 
within their supply chains. 
Third, we designed our experiments to test the effectiveness of “best 
practice” disclosures.  Although the CTSCA requires companies to make disclosures 
on five topics, the amount of information that companies are required to provide on 
each of these topics is fairly minimal.  That said, the California Attorney General’s 
office encourages companies to make “best practice” disclosures that provide more 
comprehensive information on each topic.120  In order to facilitate this goal, the 
California Attorney General’s office has released guidelines outlining the additional 
information that it recommends companies provide.121  Our experiment was designed 
to test whether following these guidelines (1) improves consumer confidence and (2) 
makes it easier for consumers to distinguish between companies that report 
comprehensive efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking and those that 
report only minimal efforts.  
Fourth, we designed our experiments to test how well consumers 
comprehend the relevant information contained within supply chain disclosures.  The 
CTSCA attempts to motivate companies to release disclosures that will be easy for 
consumers to understand.  It is not clear, however, that the format that the CTSCA 
requires of companies improves consumers’ ability to understand the content of the 
disclosures.  It is instead possible that the required format of the disclosures obscures 
the relevant information, and in doing so, makes it difficult for consumers to evaluate 
the due diligence practices and policies of a given company.  
Finally, we designed our experiments to test the reported effect that the 
supply chain disclosures would have on potential future purchasing decisions.  Of 
course, what we would ideally like to know is whether consumers are more (or less) 
likely to buy products from companies with supply chain disclosures that report better 
(or worse) due diligence practices.  Since we are unable to directly observe future 
                                                          
 120  See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8. 
 121  Id.  
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purchasing decisions, however, we can only evaluate the effect that the quality of 
disclosures has on claimed willingness to pay for products or services.122  
B. Subject Recruitment 
Our sample was recruited by Survey Sampling International (SSI).123  SSI is 
a leading market research firm that primarily conducts research for corporate clients, 
but that also works with academic researchers.  We specifically engaged SSI to 
recruit a nationally representative sample of respondents to complete a survey that 
we designed.  The sample SSI recruited was nationally representative of the U.S. 
adult population based on gender, age, race/ethnicity, and census region.  Our survey 
was administered online to 1,421 respondents during the week of February 15–19, 
2016.  Table 1 provides a demographic breakdown of our sample compared to the 
U.S. adult population.  
 





% of U.S. 
Population 
Gender    
     Male 685 48% 48% 
     Female 736 52% 52% 
Age    
     18-24 206 14% 13% 
     25-34 264 19% 18% 
     35-44 254 18% 18% 
     45-54 239 17% 19% 
     55-64 241 17% 16% 
     65+ 216 15% 17% 
Race/Ethnicity    
     White 1,030 72% 69% 
     Hispanic 129 13% 9% 
     Black 166 12% 11% 
     Asian 67 5% 4% 
     Other 27 2% 2% 
Region    
     Northeast 265 19% 18% 
     Midwest 312 22% 22% 
     South 527 37% 37% 
     West 313 22% 23% 
 
                                                          
 122  For examples of studies that also focus on willingness to pay, see, for example, Lior Jacob 
Strahilievitz & Matthew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to Consumers?, 45 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S69 (forthcoming 2016).  
 123  For more information, see SURVEY SAMPLING INTERNATIONAL, 
https://www.surveysampling.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).  
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C. Primary Experiment 
 1. Research Design 
For our primary experiment, we asked each of our respondents to read one 
disclosure.  We began by informing our respondents that “[t]he following questions 
are about company disclosures.  We will describe one disclosure posted on a 
company’s website.  We will then ask for your thoughts on the disclosure.  Thank 
you for taking the time to answer these carefully!”  After being displayed this prompt, 
on the following screen the respondents were randomly presented with one of five 
different supply chain disclosures.124  Those five disclosures are summarized in Table 
2.  
Table 2: Summary of the Five Treatment Groups 
# Name Description 
1 General Statement 
A general statement on the company’s 
commitment to human rights that did not 
discuss the five topics required by the 
CTSCA. 
2 Basic – Optimal 
A basic disclosure that suggested that the 
company was engaging in optimal efforts 
for each of the five topics required by the 
CTSCA. 
3 Basic – Minimal 
A basic disclosure that suggested that the 
company was engaging in minimal efforts 
for each of the five topics required by the 
CTSCA. 
4 Best Practice – Optimal 
A best practice disclosure that suggested 
that the company was engaging in optimal 
efforts for each of the five topics required 
by the CTSCA.  
4 Best Practice – Minimal 
A best practice disclosure that suggested 
that the company was engaging in minimal 
efforts for each of the five topics required 
by the CTSCA. 
 
  
                                                          
 124  Appendix B provides the exact text of the five disclosures used in our experiment.  
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The General Statement was taken from the CTSCA Resource Guide 
produced by the California Attorney General’s office (the “resource guide”).125  The 
resource guide specifically notes that “a general statement opposing human rights 
violations, while well-intentioned, does not suffice because it does not address the 
five areas outlined in the statute.”126  The general statement that we used was included 
in the resource guide as an example of such an inadequate general statement.  The 
statement that we used as an experimental treatment reads: 
Our company is committed to respecting the human rights of our employees.  
Our Code of Ethics and company policies adhere to the principles of free 
choice of employment, nondiscrimination, and humane treatment.  We 
ensure compliance with regulations governing child labor, minimum wage, 
and maximum working hour limitations.127 
The templates for the Basic and Best Practice disclosures used in our other 
four treatments were also based on materials in the resource guide.  For each of the 
five topics required by the CTSCA, the resource guide offers examples of basic 
disclosures that provide the minimum information required for compliance, and best 
practice disclosures that provide more detailed information with “depth and context” 
to better educate consumers on corporate activities.128  Our two basic disclosures and 
our two best practice disclosures were drawn from examples for all five topics from 
the resource guide.  As an illustration, Table 3 provides the text of the basic and best 
practice disclosures that we used for the “Certification” topic.  According to the 
resource guide, a best practice disclosure under the “Certification” topic “explain[s] 
any additional efforts [companies] make to encourage their direct suppliers to comply 
with labor and anti-trafficking laws.”129  Such additional efforts that should be 
reported in best practice disclosures include “what records [a company] requires 
suppliers to maintain to support their certification.” 
 
  
                                                          
 125  See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at 22. 
 126  Id.  
 127  Id.  
 128  Id. at ii. 
 129  Id. at 17. 
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Table 3: Example Disclosures on Supply Chain “Certification” 
Basic 
Disclosure 
We require our direct suppliers to certify that they comply 
with anti-slavery and human trafficking laws in the 
country or countries in which they do business.  
Best Practice 
Disclosure 
We require our direct suppliers to certify that they comply 
with anti-slavery and human trafficking laws in the 
country or countries in which they do business.  Our 
partners must produce records to our company.  Such 
records include: (1) proof of age for every worker; (2) 
every employee’s payroll records and timesheets; (3) 
written documentation of terms and conditions of 
employment; (4) local health and safety evaluations or 
documentation of exemption from law; and (5) records of 
employee grievances and suggestions, and any employer 
responses. 
 
In addition to randomly varying whether the disclosures we presented to 
readers were basic or best practice, we also randomly varied whether the disclosures 
reported the use of optimal efforts or minimal efforts to mitigate human rights risks 
within supply chains.  For example, for the “Certification” topic, companies must 
disclose if they require suppliers “to certify that materials incorporated into the 
product comply with the laws regarding slavery and human trafficking of the country 
or countries in which they are doing business.”130  By implication, an optimal effort 
is one that requires suppliers to certify that they comply with the anti-trafficking laws 
of the countries in which they do business, while a minimal effort is one that does not 
require suppliers to certify that they comply with these laws.  For each of the five 
topics, similar requirements exist.  For our “optimal” disclosures, the companies 
reported engaging in optimal efforts for each of the five topics.  For our minimal 
disclosures, the companies reported engaging in minimal efforts for each of the five 
topics.  Table 4 presents the policies reported in the optimal and minimal disclosures.  
On the left-hand column is the area or areas of differentiation within each topic. 
After being randomly presented with one of the five supply chain 
disclosures, we asked each respondent the following question:  “On a scale of 0 (not 
at all committed) to 100 (extremely committed), how confident do you feel that this 
company is making an effort to prevent and root out slavery and human trafficking 
in its supply chain?” 
 
  
                                                          
 130  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(3). 
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Table 4: Differences between Optimal and Minimal Policies 




  – # of Suppliers Audited 
 
? all direct 
suppliers 
? a sample of 
direct suppliers 
 
  – Frequency of Audits ? once a year ? (no mention) 
 
  – Use of a Third Party ? third-party 
auditors  





 – Frequency of Audits ? third-party 
auditors 
 
? internal auditors 
 – Announcement of Audits ? unannounced 
audits 
 
? announced audits 
 
 – Number of Suppliers ? all direct 
suppliers 






  – Policy on Certification ? require suppliers 
to certify 






  – Result of a Supplier’s 
Failure to Take Action on 
Non-Compliance 
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 2. Results 
Figure 4 reports the results of our primary experiment.131  The dots represent 
the mean response and the lines represent the 95% confidence interval for each of the 
five treatment groups.  Dots further to the left (or right) represent less (or more) 
confidence in the hypothetical company’s efforts to eradicate slavery and human 
trafficking in its supply chain.  
Figure 4: Primary Experimental Results 
 
The results in Figure 4 produce several important insights.  First, and most 
notably, the average responses for all of the disclosures fell in a narrow range.  On a 
scale of 0 to 100, all five disclosures scored within a 10-point range: the (4) Best 
Practice – Optimal disclosure received an average score of 75, and the (3) 
Basic – Minimal disclosure received an average score of 65.  Moreover, the 
disclosure that was completely non-compliant—the General Statement—received 
the median average score of 67.132  
Second, our experiment was designed to evaluate whether the mandated 
format of CTSCA disclosures—that is, including the five required topics—improves 
consumer confidence compared to more general disclosures that report a company’s 
broad commitment to human rights.  To test this, one of the disclosures used as a 
treatment was a general statement that the California Attorney General’s office 
specifically indicated as not covering the topics required by the CTSCA.  The mean 
response for respondents given the General Statement was 67 (95% CI: 65, 70).  
                                                          
 131  Appendix C provides tables that report the results presented in Figures 4–7.  Because our 
treatment was randomized (and balance testing does not reveal any imbalance across the treatment 
groups), we simply report the differences in means for the five treatment groups.  In regression results 
reported in Appendix D, we estimate an OLS regression while controlling for the demographic variables 
in Table 1.  The results when doing so are substantively the same as the results in Figure 4. 
 132  The Basic Practice – Optimal Disclosure received an average score of 69, and the Best 
Practice – Minimal received a 67.  
Confidence in Company's Efforts (0 = Not at All / 100 = Extremely)
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The mean responses for both groups that were given the basic compliant statements 
were comparable.  The mean response for the participants that were given the 
Basic – Optimal disclosure was 69 (95% CI: 67, 72) and the mean response for the 
Basic – Minimal disclosure was 65 (95% CI: 62, 68).  The difference between the 
General Statement and these two treatments was not statistically significant.  These 
results illustrate that a company that minimally complies with the CTSCA does not 
garner more confidence from consumers than a company that issues a general (non-
compliant) statement on its commitment to respecting the human rights of its 
employees.  
Third, our experiment was designed to evaluate whether consumers are 
likely to have greater confidence in companies that make optimal efforts to eradicate 
slavery and human trafficking in their supply chains, as compared to those that make 
minimal efforts to do so.  To test this, our treatments included examples of disclosures 
reporting that companies were engaging in optimal and minimal efforts for each of 
the topics required by the CTSCA.  The results in Figure 4 reveal that for both the 
basic and best practice disclosures, the participants reported higher levels of 
confidence in response to the “optimal” disclosures.  For the basic disclosure, 
however, the difference is substantively small and far from statistically significant.  
This suggests that companies that report comprehensive efforts to mitigate human 
rights risks within their supply chains are not necessarily perceived better by 
consumers as compared to companies that report only minimal efforts. 
Fourth, our experiment was designed to evaluate whether disclosures 
following the best practice guidelines promulgated by the State of California: (1) 
improve consumer confidence, and (2) make it easier for consumers to tell the 
difference between a company that reports that it undertakes comprehensive supply 
due diligence and one that reports minimal efforts to mitigate human rights risks in 
its supply chain.  The results presented in Figure 4 suggest that the respondents that 
are given the Best Practice – Optimal disclosure report a higher level of confidence 
as compared to all the other treatments in a statistically significant way.  Moreover, 
the gap between the Best Practice – Optimal treatment and the Best 
Practice – Minimal treatment is greater than the gap between the two basic 
treatments.  That said, it is slightly troubling that the Basic – Optimal and Best 
Practice – Minimal disclosures score almost exactly the same (69 and 67, 
respectively) on a 100-point scale.  In other words, if a company conducting a low 
level of due diligence simply frames its policies in the best practice format, it would 
potentially receive as much credit from consumers as a company with a high level of 
due diligence that does not adhere to the best practice (longer and more detailed) 
model.  
C. Additional Tests 
In addition to the primary experiment reported in the previous section, our 
survey also included three other tests of how respondents reacted to supply chain 
disclosures.  In this section, we report the results of each of these tests.  
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1. Influence of Disclosures on Comprehension 
In addition to testing how the disclosures influenced consumer confidence, 
we also wanted to know how well the respondents comprehended the disclosures.  As 
a result, after the respondents were asked a few unrelated demographic questions, we 
then asked the respondents five questions about the content of the disclosures.  
 
Table 5: Comprehension Questions 
Auditor Identity Who did it say conducted the audits?  
Audit Frequency How often are the audits conducted? 
Notice 
How much warning are suppliers given before the 
audits occur?  
Training What did it say the company provides training on?  
Conflict Minerals 
What did it say the company is doing to make sure 
conflict minerals are not used in its supply chain? 
 
Table 5 lists the five comprehension questions that we posed to our 
respondents.  To eliminate the possibility of any ordering effects, these five questions 
were presented in random order.   For each of the five questions, we presented 
respondents with four answer choices.  One of the four answer choices for each 
question was that the disclosure did not mention the topic.  
It is important to note that the correct answer was not the same for all of the 
treatment groups.  For example, for the respondents that received the General 
Statement, it was correct to answer all five questions by saying that the disclosure did 
not mention the topic.  As another example, for the respondents that received the 
Optimal treatments it was correct to say that “A Third Party” conducted the audits, 
but for the respondents that received the Minimal treatments it was correct to say that 
“An Internal Team of Auditors” conducted the audits.  
Figure 5 presents the mean number (and 95% confidence interval) of 
comprehension questions that the respondents in each of the treatment groups 
answered correctly.  The results are noteworthy in two particular ways. 
First, the respondents that received the General Statement disclosure 
correctly answered the most questions: 2.88 (95% CI: 2.70, 3.60).  As previously 
noted, this is perhaps unsurprising because the correct answer for each question for 
respondents that received this treatment was that the disclosure did not mention the 
topic.  Notice, however, that respondents that were presented with just this short 
statement still provided on average an incorrect answer 2 out of 5 times.  
Second, the respondents that received the Basic Statement – Optimal 
disclosure answered more questions correctly than the respondents that received 
either of the Best Practice treatments.  These differences were both highly statistically 
significant (p < 0.001).  The respondents that received this treatment answered 2.39 
(95% CI: 2.25, 2.53) questions correct, compared to 1.87 (90% CI: 1.76, 1.97) for the 
Best Practice – Optimal treatment and 1.54 (90% CI: 1.42, 1.65) for respondents that 
received the Best Practice – Minimal treatment.  In other words, the recipients of the 
Best Practice treatment knew less about the content of the treatments than 
respondents that received a basic disclosure.  This result suggests that the best 
CHILTON & SARFATY REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2017  7:02 PM 
36 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 53:1 
practice guidance promulgated by the California government is not achieving its 
intended result of enhancing consumer comprehension.  
 
Figure 5: Comprehension Questions Correctly Answered 
 
2. Views on Actual Disclosures 
One concern with our primary experiment is that we asked respondents to 
evaluate artificial disclosures that we designed for our study.  It would be reasonable 
to be concerned that the disclosures we designed might not accurately reflect the kind 
of language and claims that actual companies report.  As a result, we also used real 
disclosures to test how confident respondents were in the efforts that companies were 
taking to eradicate human rights abuses. 
More specifically, we conducted two additional tests that used real CTSCA 
disclosures:  Half of our respondents were randomly presented with the test we 
discuss in this section, and the other half of the respondents were presented with the 
test presented in the next section (Part III.D.3).133   
For these additional tests, we identified two large apparel companies 
operating in the United States that have made disclosures under the CTSCA.  We 
specifically selected two companies that sell similar clothing and are frequently 
identified as direct competitors.  Since our goal was to test whether consumers were 
able to identify the company with the better disclosure, we also specifically selected 
one company—which we refer to as “Mystery Corp.”—that has a “bad” disclosure 
and one company—that we refer to as “Anonymous Corp.”—that has a “good” 
                                                          
 133  See Appendix A for a graphic illustration of the survey flow.  We presented the respondents 
with only one of these two additional tests for two reasons.  First, both tests asked respondents to evaluate 
the same set of real CTSCA disclosures, so it would not be possible to complete both tests.  Second, we 
did not want our survey to be excessively long.  
Number of Correct Comprehension Questions (Out of 5)
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5. Best Practice - Minimal
4. Best Practice - Optimal
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2. Basic Statement - Optimal
1. General Statement
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disclosure.  Our categorization of the two companies was based on several factors 
including: (1) Mystery primarily relies on internal auditors while Anonymous uses 
third-party auditors; (2) Mystery’s audits are both announced and unannounced while 
those by Anonymous are only unannounced (within a broad window of time); and 
(3) there is no indication of the frequency of Mystery’s audits while those by 
Anonymous occur once per year. 
For the first additional test, we presented respondents with both 
disclosures.134  To avoid any ordering effects, we randomized the order that the 
disclosures were presented.  After being shown both disclosures, the respondents 
were asked:  “How confident do you feel that both of these companies are making 
the best effort to prevent and root out slavery and human trafficking in their supply 
chain?”  They were then asked to rank both companies on a scale from 0 (not at all 
confident) to 100 (extremely confident).  
Figure 6: Confidence After Reading Actual Disclosures 
 
Figure 6 presents the results of this experimental test.  The respondents rated 
the statement from Mystery Corp. with an average score of 67.52 (90% CI: 65.90, 
69.14) and the statement from Anonymous Corp. with an average score of 70.26 
(90% CI: 68.60, 71.92).  Although this difference is statistically significant at the 
0.05 level (p = 0.02), substantively it is quite small.  On a scale of 0 to 100, 
respondents rated the “good” statement only three points better than the bad 
statement.  This is despite the fact that the good statement exhibits more 
comprehensive supply chain due diligence, particularly its use of unannounced, third-
party audits.  As a result, although it is reassuring that the respondents agreed with 
our assessment regarding which statement is better, the narrow gap between the two 
statements suggests that consumers did not identify a dramatic difference between 
the two—despite the fact that one company reported a much lower level of due 
diligence as compared to the other company.  
                                                          
 134  Half of the respondents were shown versions of these disclosures with the company’s names 
replaced with “Mystery” and “Anonymous”; the other half of the respondents were shown versions of 
these disclosures that included the company’s name.  This is because our next experiment required 
disclosing the company name, and we wanted to be sure the relative responses to the disclosures were 
consistent (which they were) regardless of whether the consumers knew the identity of the companies.  
Confidence in Company's Efforts (0 = Not at All / 100 = Extremely)
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3. Reported Influence on Purchasing Decisions 
As previously noted, one of the things we would ideally like to know is 
whether consumers change their purchasing decisions as a consequence of supply 
chain disclosures.  Although we are not able to directly test this with a survey 
experiment, we did try to test the effect that supply chain disclosures have on self-
reported purchasing decisions. 
To do so, the half of respondents that were given this experimental test were 
asked how likely they were to purchase a product from either Mystery Corp. or 
Anonymous Corp. in the next year on a scale of 0 to 100.135  To be clear, each 
respondent given this additional test was only asked about one company.  After 
providing an answer, we then presented the respondents with the disclosure from the 
company they were asked about, and asked them again how likely they were to 
purchase a product from the company in the next year.  This allowed us to measure 
whether respondents claimed to be more or less interested in purchasing a product 
from the company after seeing the quality of its supply chain disclosure.  
7. Reported Influence on Purchasing Decisions 
 
Figure 7 presents the results of this test.  There are two points worth noting 
about the results.  First, the respondents that were asked about both companies 
claimed to be more likely to buy products from the companies after having been 
presented with the disclosures.  What is interesting about this result, however, is that 
the disclosure for Mystery Corp. did not reveal a high level of due diligence.  In other 
words, even when shown a disclosure reporting minimal efforts by a company to root 
out human rights abuses within its supply chain, the respodnents nevertheless had a 
positive reaction to the statement.  
Second, the respondents shown the Anonymous Corp. statement—which 
reports higher levels of due diligence as compared to the Mystery Corp. statement—
did exhibit a larger increase in their stated willingness to buy the product after being 
                                                          
 135  The respondents were presented with the actual names of the companies. 
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shown the statement.  Respondents shown the Mystery Corp. statement reported 
being nine percentage points more likely to buy a product after having read the 
statement, whereas respondents shown the Anonymous Corp. statement reported 
being thirteen percentage points more likely.  This difference is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level (p = 0.01).  This provides some additional evidence that 
respondents react moderately more positively to supply chain disclosures that report 
higher levels of due diligence.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS  
Given the growing use of disclosure laws as a mechanism to hold companies 
accountable for human rights abuses abroad, our examination of the first such law 
aimed at consumers offers lessons for future policymaking and contributes to the 
disclosure regulation literature.  
A. Summary of Results 
Taken together, our experimental tests of supply chain disclosures produced 
several clear findings.  The result that should be most reassuring for advocates of 
supply chain disclosure regimes is that respondents did consistently have the most 
confidence in disclosures that reported the highest levels of due diligence.  In the 
primary experiment, the Best Practice – Optimal disclosure was rated the highest by 
respondents.  In addition, in the two experimental tests where respondents were asked 
to evaluate real disclosures, the disclosure we had previously identified as reporting 
higher levels of due diligence (the “Anonymous Corp.” disclosure) performed better.  
This gives some confidence that consumers may be able to interpret the relative value 
of supply chain disclosures.   
There were two other results, however, that paint a less optimistic picture.  
First, the respondents consistently rated disclosures that either contained no 
information136 or reported low levels of due diligence137 almost as highly as 
disclosures that reported a high level of due diligence.  The substantive effects of the 
treatments were small in these experimental tests, which suggests that companies 
may receive little benefit from consumers for engaging in expensive and time-
consuming due diligence.  
Second, the respondents that were presented with Best Practice disclosures 
correctly answered fewer comprehension questions.  This suggests that the 
consumers may not be responding to the content of the disclosures, but simply 
responding to the fact that the Best Practice disclosures were longer (similarly, the 
Anonymous Corp. disclosure was slightly longer than the Mystery Corp. disclosure).  
If the respondents do not understand the content of the best practice disclosures any 
better, it may call into question the value of pushing companies to adopt these 
regimes.  
                                                          
 136  For example, the “General Statement” treatment in the primary experiment.  
 137  For example, the minimal disclosures in the primary experiment or the Mystery Corp. disclosure 
in the additional tests. 
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B. Limitations of Our Research 
Before discussing the implications of our research, however, it is important 
to acknowledge that our method has several limitations.  First, it is possible that the 
respondents that completed our survey and experiment are different than the 
consumers that supply chain disclosures are directed at.  This could be true if supply 
chain disclosures are aimed at communicating information to a select core of 
interested consumers and not the overall population.  
Second, the respondents that completed our survey and experiment were 
presented with information in an artificial environment.  If consumers were to 
encounter supply chain disclosures while researching companies and products, they 
might behave differently than respondents who were presented the information 
during an academic survey.  
Third, we should note that our empirical study of the CTSCA does not 
measure the actual effectiveness of supply chain disclosure laws in influencing the 
purchasing decisions of consumers and changing corporate behavior.  Since the law 
only recently went into effect, more time is needed before researchers can evaluate 
its implementation. 
Fourth, although our results provide some reasons to be pessimistic about 
consumers’ ability to interpret the information provided in CTSCA disclosures, those 
disclosures still may have an effect.  For example, it is possible that non-profit 
organizations like KnowTheChain may be able to present the information in ways 
that consumers are better able to understand.  Additionally, even if consumers have 
difficulty assessing companies’ efforts to mitigate human rights risks in corporate 
supply chains, the requirement to post a disclosure may compel companies to 
examine and eventually improve their practices. 
C. Implications & Agenda for Future Research 
Despite these limitations, our research suggests several important policy 
implications and directions for future research.  First, our data suggest that simply 
passing a law does not ensure that companies will comply.  Our analysis of the 
observational data we collected revealed that 52% of companies fully complied with 
their obligation to post CTSCA disclosures.  This suggests that if policy makers want 
companies to comply with disclosure requirements, enforcement efforts likely need 
to be strengthened in order to incentivize companies to comply.  For example, the 
remedy for failure to comply with the CTSCA is an action brought by the Attorney 
General of California for injunctive relief.  However, the Attorney General of 
California has thus far not brought any actions.138  If government officials feel that 
formally bringing an action against companies is not desirable policy, the government 
could alternatively publicly shame companies by publicizing a list of firms that fail 
to post disclosures or report on all five required topics in their disclosures.  
Additionally, a key finding from our experiment reveals that government-
issued best practice guidelines may not make it easier for consumers to tell the 
difference between companies that are making optimal and minimal efforts to 
                                                          
 138  See supra text accompanying note 71. 
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eradicate risks to human rights within their supply chains.  In the case of the CTSCA, 
the Office of the California Attorney General issued a resource guide in 2015 that 
“intended to help covered companies by offering recommendations about model 
disclosures and best practices for developing such disclosures.”139  According to the 
resource guide, companies using best practice disclosures are going beyond 
compliance to “more fully educate the public about the integrity of their supply 
chains.”140  Model disclosures thus aim to enhance consumers’ understanding of 
companies’ anti-trafficking efforts.  
However, our research demonstrates that the best practice disclosures do not 
in fact enhance consumers’ understanding of company activities.  In fact, among 
respondents presented with Basic and Best Practice disclosures, there was not a 
statistically significant difference between their reactions to the Basic – Optimal 
disclosure and the Best Practice – Minimal disclosure.  While consumers do care if a 
company violates human rights and are concerned about the human rights of 
employees in corporate supply chains, it appears that they may simply use length of 
disclosures as a proxy for quality.  They may assume that a long disclosure that 
follows best practice recommendations necessarily reflects that a company is making 
an optimal effort to mitigate human rights risks within its supply chain.  What may 
be most striking is that the one non-compliant disclosure, simply including a brief 
general statement of the company’s support of human rights, fared as well as the Best 
Practice – Minimal disclosure and almost as well as the Basic – Optimal disclosure.  
This result suggests that consumers are not able to appropriately differentiate 
between the quality of the efforts a company is undertaking, or even whether a 
company is being compliant or not.  
In addition to these two issues—that is, a low level of compliance and the 
fact that the best practice guidelines do not seem to improve consumer 
understanding—our research also calls into question the wisdom of trusting 
companies to disclose information about their own activities.  As part of our survey, 
we also asked respondents to rate how much they would trust different sources of 
information about a company’s supply chain.  The results of this question are 
presented in Figure 8.  
  
                                                          
 139  CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at i. 
 140  Id. at 1. 
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Figure 8: Reported Trust in Potential Sources of Information 
 
 
As Figure 8 clearly shows, the source of information considered least 
trustworthy by the public is information disclosed by companies.  This suggests that 
although asking companies to disclose information may be the cheapest form of 
regulation, it is also perhaps the least likely to improve consumer confidence 
(assuming that the information disclosed by the company is not independently 
verified by a third party).   
Given the limitations in the CTSCA that our research reveals, is there any 
hope in targeting human rights-related supply chain disclosures at consumers?  
Scholars have claimed that that there is in fact consumer demand for ethical 
products,141 and our research seems to support this.  Empirical studies have 
demonstrated a positive relationship between observed sales and/or prices of goods, 
and their ethical characteristics.142  For instance, a field experiment on eBay found 
                                                          
 141  A 1999 poll by the National Bureau of Economic Research found that about 80% of individuals 
said they were willing to pay more for an item if assured it was made under good working conditions.  
See KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE UNDER 
GLOBALIZATION? 28 (2003); Pat Auger et al., What Will Consumers Pay for Social Product Features?, 
42 J. BUS. ETHICS 281 (2003); Patrick De Pelsmacker et al., Do Consumers Care about Ethics? 
Willingness to Pay for Fair-Trade Coffee, 39 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 361 (2005); Marsha A. Dickson, 
Utility of No Sweat Labels for Apparel Consumers: Profiling Label Users and Predicting Their Purchase, 
35 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 96 (2001); Shareen Hertel et al., Human Rights and Public Opinion: From 
Attitudes to Action, 124 POL. SCI. Q. 443 (2009); Michael J. Hiscox & Nicholas F.B. Smyth, Is There 
Consumer Demand for Improved Labor Standards? Evidence from Field Experiments in Social Product 
Labeling (Apr. 22, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1820642; Maria L. Loureiro & Justus Lotade, Do Fair 
Trade and Eco-Labels in Coffee Wake Up the Consumer Conscience?, 53 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 129 
(2005); Lois A. Mohr & Deborah J. Webb, The Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility and Price on 
Consumer Responses, 39 J. CONSUMER AFF. 121 (2005). 
 142  Teisl et al. examined scanner data on U.S. retail sales of canned tuna and found that market 
share (relative to other canned seafood and meat) rose substantially after the introduction of the “dolphin-
safe” label in April 1990.  Mario F. Teisl et al., Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market? Evidence from Dolphin-
Safe Labeling, 43 J. ENVT’L ECON. & MGMT. 339 (2002). 
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that shoppers paid a 23% premium for Fair Trade labeled versus unlabeled coffees.143  
Thus, there is evidence that some consumers have displayed a preference for 
information about the ethical practices of companies, and have used that information 
to shape their buying behavior.  Given that backdrop, supply chain disclosure regimes 
provide information that a subset of consumers reportedly care about, as our own 
research demonstrates as well. 
 
Figure 9: Concern About Aspects of Products  
 
 
Figure 9 reports the results of our question that asked respondents how much 
they care about different factors when buying a product.  Specifically, we asked 
respondents:  “How much do you care about the following factors when buying a 
product?”  We then asked respondents to rate five items on a scale from 1 to 5, where 
1 represents the least amount of care and 5 is a high degree of care.  The respondents 
reported caring a significant amount about the price of the product and the quality of 
the product.  The mean score for the price of the product is 3.52 and the mean score 
for the quality of the product is 3.89.  Out of the remaining factors, respondents 
reported caring most about the human rights of the employees making the product 
(the mean score is 3.13), as compared to the environmental impact of the product (the 
mean score is 2.66) and where the product was made (the mean score is 2.47).  
In light of potential consumer demand for human rights-related information 
on products, future research is needed to determine how supply chain disclosure laws 
can be improved.  There are a variety of possible options that could be considered.  
For instance, instead of issuing model disclosures, governments can design and test 
a uniform template that companies would be required to use.144  A standard form 
could include a limited number of questions—for instance, “do you use unannounced 
                                                          
 143  Michael J. Hiscox et al., Consumer Demand for Fair Trade: New Evidence from a Field 
Experiment Using eBay Auctions of Fresh Roasted Coffee 1 (Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1811783. 
 144  See Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 404. 
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audits?” and “do you use a third-party verifier?”  A uniform template could aid 
consumer comprehension and facilitate comparison across companies.  
Another option is to present disclosures at the point of sale, rather than rely 
on consumers to seek out the information on corporate websites.  These types of 
disclosures, referred to as “targeted transparency,” mandate information at the time 
of decision-making in order to “nudge” consumer behavior.145  Targeted disclosures 
may necessitate a rating system whereby the government or a third party converts 
disclosed information into a grade or label (e.g., a trafficking-free label) that is 
presented to consumers at the time of purchase.146  This information could also be 
available to consumers through apps, several of which already provide information 
on companies’ ethical practices.147  In fact, the G7 recently released a statement in 
support of responsible supply chains that calls for the development of “impartial tools 
[such as relevant apps] to help consumers and public procurers . . . compare 
information on the validity and credibility of social and environmental product 
labels.”148   
In considering whether to add a labeling requirement to disclosure laws, 
policymakers need to tread carefully given the D.C. Circuit Court’s recent conflict 
minerals ruling.  In August 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia held that the labeling requirement in section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
(whereby companies must report on whether or not their products are “conflict-free”) 
was considered “compelled speech” in violation of the First Amendment.149  The 
ruling, however, upheld the remainder of the disclosure requirements within the 
conflict minerals due diligence and reporting regime.  
Governments can also develop and release a list of “slave-free” companies 
or “dirty” companies, which could influence not only consumers but also 
governments’ own contracting decisions.  A similar mechanism has been used by the 
Brazilian government, which updates a “dirty list” of companies that use slave 
labor.150  Firms on this list pay a series of fines and cannot obtain credit from the 
government or private banks.151  They are also boycotted by those who have signed 
up to a National Pact for the Eradication of Slave Labor.152  Companies on the “dirty 
list” have two years to clean up their supply chains before being given the opportunity 
to get off the list.  
                                                          
 145  See RICHARD M. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); FUNG, GRAHAM & WEL, supra note 14, at 39–46. 
 146  For an analysis of rating systems based on an empirical study of restaurant sanitation grading, 
see Ho, supra note 14.  
 147  Existing apps that monitor human rights within corporate supply chains include Free2Work 
(www.free2work.org), GoodGuide (www.goodguide.com), and Slavery Footprint 
(www.slaveryfootprint.org).  
 148  Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, G-7 Leaders’ Declaration in 
Schloss Emau, Germany (June 8, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/08/g-7-
leaders-declaration. 
 149  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 150  See Annie Kelly, Brazil’s “Dirty List” Names and Shames Companies Involved in Slave 
Labour, THE GUARDIAN (July 24, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/brazil-dirty-
list-names-shames-slave-labour. 
 151  Id. 
 152  See National Pact for the Eradication of Slave Labor, INT’L LABOR ORG. (2005), 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---ilo-
washington/documents/genericdocument/wcms_189835.pdf. 
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Finally, it may be worth entirely reconsidering the wisdom of trying to 
reduce slavery and human trafficking through the use of mandatory disclosure 
regimes.  As previously noted, research in other areas has questioned the value of 
disclosure regimes.153  Our research suggests that, although consumers may care 
about human rights, it is not clear that supply chain disclosures will help them make 
more informed decisions.  After all, simply posting information about supply chain 
audits on company websites does not necessarily lead to changes in consumer 
behavior.   
The one thing that is clear from our study is that further research is needed 
to test the effectiveness of these options before designing future supply chain 
regulations.  Disclosure requirements and best practice guidelines should be drafted 
based on empirical evidence of what would most effectively communicate relevant 
information to consumers.  It is important to keep in mind that providing more 
information may have the unintended consequence of inhibiting consumer 
comprehension.  In addition, given the difficulty of interpreting human rights 
disclosures, more research is also needed on: (1) which factors (e.g., a company’s 
industry, the country in which it operates, or the number of its suppliers) have the 
largest impact on the risk of human rights violations in corporate supply chains; (2) 
the relationship between these factors and actual human rights outcomes; (3) which 
aspects of due diligence are most likely to minimize potential human rights risks; and 
(4) the likelihood that such information would in fact shape consumer purchasing 
decisions in the field.  Such research is necessary before more countries follow in the 
steps of the United Kingdom in passing supply chain disclosure laws that model the 
flawed CTSCA.  
CONCLUSION 
In response to growing concern over corporate complicity in human rights 
abuses, laws have been adopted—and are currently being proposed—that require 
companies to disclose their efforts to mitigate human rights risks in their supply 
chains.  To date, however, these laws have been subject to little empirical scrutiny.  
In this Article, we argued that the effectiveness of supply chain disclosure regimes is 
likely to be limited.  This is not only because disclosure regimes in other contexts 
have been shown to be frequently ineffective, but also because unique features of 
supply chain disclosures make them especially difficult to interpret.  In order to test 
our argument, we administered a series of experimental tests designed to measure 
consumers’ confidence and comprehension of supply chain disclosures to a 
nationally representative sample of respondents.  Although there were some positive 
findings for advocates of supply chain disclosure regimes, the respondents 
consistently rated disclosures reporting low levels of due diligence almost as highly 
as disclosures that reported a high level of due diligence.  In other words, our 
experimental results are broadly consistent with our theory.  
We believe that the evidence presented in this study suggests that it may be 
time to reconsider the design of current supply chain disclosure laws, especially given 
the recently passed U.K. law modeled after the CTSCA and current efforts to pass 
                                                          
 153  See, e.g., BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13. 
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similar laws on the federal level and in Australia.154  Although consumers may be 
interested in whether a company’s supply chain is free from human rights abuses, 
current corporate disclosures do not help consumers determine which companies are 
making comprehensive efforts to achieve that goal.  Taken together, our results thus 
suggest that the current disclosure regimes have serious limitations.  Although the 
goal of improving corporate human rights practices is admirable, the current 
disclosure regimes are not a well-designed way to achieve it. 
  
  
                                                          
 154  See sources cited supra note 9. 
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APPENDIX A – FLOW OF THE SURVEY 
 
Figure: Illustration of the Flow of the Survey Experiment 
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APPENDIX B – TEXT OF THE EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS 
1. General Statement 
Our company is committed to respecting the human rights of our employees.  Our 
Code of Ethics and company policies adhere to the principles of free choice of 
employment, nondiscrimination, and humane treatment.  We ensure compliance with 
regulations governing child labor, minimum wage, and maximum working hour 
limitations. 
 
2. Basic – Optimal Disclosure 
 
Verification 
We conduct assessments of all of our direct suppliers once a year to verify that they 
are not at risk for violating anti-slavery and human trafficking laws.  Third party 
auditors spearhead the verification process using a multi-level process to identify and 
evaluate potential risks. 
   
Supplier Audits 
Third party auditors conduct unannounced audits of all of our direct suppliers once a 




We require our direct suppliers to certify that they comply with anti-slavery and 
human trafficking laws in the country or countries in which they do business. 
  
Internal Accountability 
We have developed internal accountability standards and procedures for employees 
and contractors failing to meet our company standards regarding slavery and 
trafficking.  If and when our company uncovers employee or contractor compliance 
problems, we provide written notice and a specified period of time to take corrective 
action.  Failure to take action results in termination of the relationship. 
  
Training 
Our company provides employees with training on mitigating the risks of human 
trafficking and slavery within our company’s supply chains of products. 
 
3. Basic – Minimal Disclosure 
 
 Verification 
We conduct assessments of a sample of our direct suppliers to verify that they are not 
at risk for violating anti-slavery and human trafficking laws.  Our internal auditors 
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Supplier Audits 
Our internal auditors conduct announced audits of a sample of our direct suppliers to 




We request our direct suppliers to certify that they comply with anti-slavery and 
human trafficking laws in the country or countries in which they do business. 
  
Internal Accountability 
We have developed internal accountability standards and procedures for employees 
and contractors failing to meet our company standards regarding slavery and 
trafficking.  If and when our company uncovers employee or contractor compliance 
problems, we provide written notice and suggest corrective actions. 
 
Training 
Our company provides employees with training on the importance of respecting the 
human rights. 
 
4. Best Practice  – Optimal Disclosure 
 
Verification 
We conduct assessments of all of our direct suppliers twice a year to verify that they 
are not at risk for violating anti-slavery and human trafficking laws.  Third party 
auditors spearhead the verification process using a multi-level process to identify and 
evaluate potential risks.  Prior to partnering with any new suppliers, and twice a year 
thereafter, our monitor conducts an initial screening of those suppliers.  During the 
next level of review, our monitor requires prospective and current suppliers to 
respond in writing to questions regarding areas of concern raised during the initial 
screening process.  The monitor then assesses which suppliers pose the highest risk 
in human trafficking, and reports these findings to our executive management team. 
 
Supplier Audits 
Third party auditors conduct unannounced audits of all of our direct suppliers twice 
a year to evaluate their compliance with our anti-slavery and human trafficking 
company standards.  Audits consist of individual and group interviews with 
supervisors and management, as well as exhaustive facility tours.  We monitor 
supplier behavior and compliance through the use of a professional third-party 
auditing firm, which performs extensive unannounced investigations. 
 
Certification 
We require our direct suppliers to certify that they comply with anti-slavery and 
human trafficking laws in the country or countries in which they do business.  Our 
partners must produce records to our company.  Such records include: (1) proof of 
age for every worker; (2) every employee’s payroll records and timesheets; (3) 
written documentation of terms and conditions of employment; (4) local health and 
safety evaluations or documentation of exemption from law; and (5) records of 
employee grievances and suggestions, and any employer responses. 
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Internal Accountability 
We have developed internal accountability standards and procedures for employees 
and contractors failing to meet our company standards regarding slavery and 
trafficking.  In the last year, our team conducted visits to all of our supplier factories 
to audit internal grievance mechanisms.  We evaluated the existing communication 
channels in these factories and assessed their adequacy, reviewing the frequency of 
grievances reported and resolved.  Auditors work with employees and contractors to 
develop action plans to resolve any such instances of non-compliance.  If and when 
our company uncovers employee or contractor compliance problems, we provide 
written notice and a specified period of time to take corrective action.  Failure to take 
action results in termination of the relationship. 
  
Training 
Our company provides employees with training on mitigating the risks of human 
trafficking and slavery within our company’s supply chains of products.  Last 
summer, we conducted a three-day annual seminar for our employees and managers 
who are directly responsible for selecting and overseeing our suppliers.  Our supply 
chain management staff consists of two vice-presidents and one operations manager. 
  
5. Best Practice  – Minimal Disclosure 
 
Verification 
We conduct assessments of a sample of our direct suppliers to verify that they are not 
at risk for violating anti-slavery and human trafficking laws.  Our internal auditors 
spearhead the verification process using a multi-level process to identify and evaluate 
potential risks.  Prior to partnering with any new suppliers, our monitor conducts an 
initial screening of those suppliers.  During the next level of review, our monitor 
requests prospective and current suppliers to respond in writing to questions 
regarding areas of concern raised during the initial screening process.  The monitor 
then assesses which suppliers pose the highest risk in human trafficking, and reports 
these findings to our executive management team. 
  
Supplier Audits 
Our internal auditors conduct announced audits of a sample of our direct suppliers to 
evaluate their compliance with our anti-slavery and human trafficking company 
standards.  Audits consist of individual and group interviews with supervisors and 
management, as well as exhaustive facility tours.  We monitor supplier behavior and 




We request our direct suppliers to certify that they comply with anti-slavery and 
human trafficking laws in the country or countries in which they do business.  Our 
partners are asked to produce records to our company.   Such records include: (1) 
proof of age for every worker; (2) every employee’s payroll records and timesheets; 
(3) written documentation of terms and conditions of employment; (4) local health 
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and safety evaluations or documentation of exemption from law; and (5) records of 
employee grievances and suggestions, and any employer responses. 
  
Internal Accountability 
We have developed internal accountability standards and procedures for employees 
and contractors failing to meet our company standards regarding slavery and 
trafficking.   Our team has conducted visits to a sample of our supplier factories to 
audit internal grievance mechanisms.   We evaluated the existing communication 
channels in these factories and assessed their adequacy, reviewing the frequency of 
grievances reported and resolved.   Auditors work with employees and contractors to 
develop action plans to resolve any such instances of non-compliance.   If and when 
our company uncovers employee or contractor compliance problems, we provide 
written notice and suggest corrective actions. 
 
Training 
Our company provides employees with training on the importance of respecting the 
human rights.  Last summer, we conducted a one-day annual seminar for our 
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APPENDIX C – TABLES OF THE RESULTS FROM THE EXPERIMENTS   




 – Optimal 
Disclosure 
Basic 
 – Minimal 
Disclosure 
Best Practice 





67.04 69.73 65.06 75.16 66.84 
(64.53, 69.55) (67.14, 72.33) (62.14, 67.99) (72.87, 77.46) (64.23, 69.44) 
 




 – Optimal 
Disclosure 
Basic 
 – Minimal 
Disclosure 
Best Practice 





2.88 2.39 1.80 1.87 1.54 
(2.70, 3.06) (2.25, 2.53) (1.67, 1.93) (1.76, 1.97) (1.43, 1.65) 
 






(65.90, 69.14) (68.60, 71.92) 
 

















40.66 49.58 32.27 45.17 
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APPENDIX D – OLS MODEL FOR THE PRIMARY EXPERIMENT 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 67.268*** 65.546*** 
 (1.267) (2.396) 
Basic - Optimal 2.466 2.306 
 (1.832) (1.837) 
Basic - Minimal -1.720 -1.378 
 (1.830) (1.836) 
Best Practice - Optimal 8.1615*** 8.265*** 
 (1.803) (1.807) 
Best Practice - Minimal 0.247 0.468 
 (1.786) (1.796) 
Gender - Male  1.096 
  (1.172) 
Age - 25-34  0.530 
  (2.034) 
Age - 35-44  2.111 
  (2.061) 
Age - 45-54  2.396 
  (2.094) 
Age - 55-64  -1.007 
  (2.107) 
Age - 65+  0.229 
  (2.162) 
Race/Ethnicity - Hispanic  -5.365* 
  (2.101) 
Race/Ethnicity - Black  0.133 
  (1.850) 
Race/Ethnicity - Asian  -4.281 
  (2.803) 
Race/Ethnicity - Other  -8.764* 
  (4.229) 
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Region - Midwest  1.290 
  (1.822) 
Region - South  0.888 
  (1.656) 
Region - West  2.453 
  (1.836) 
   
Observations 1405 1401 
-- Standard errors in parentheses.  
-- *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, ** p <0.01. 
 
 
 
 
